Agent-based Networks of Corporate Lending

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23/09/2014

Based on research with U. Kochańska (ECB) and Ch. Kok (ECB)

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Motivation

- Recent financial crisis: loss of trust on the interbank market; concerns about failure of one of the key players spreading contagion; small shocks with detrimental effects
- A response from regulators: measures to mitigate the risk $\Rightarrow$ higher capital standards + reducing bilateral exposures
  - Large Exposure limits;
  - Credit Valuation Adjustment to unlock the risk in OTC exposures and immediately reflect it in the capital
  - Standard settlement practices (CCP framework)
  - ...but usually only interbank market modelled $\rightarrow$ a large part of the network is neglected
- Our aim:
  - fill the gap in the literature to improve understanding of:
    - linkages between banks and the real economy (non-bank corporate sector)
    - risk stemming from interconnectedness
- Approach: modelling of banks’ reactions to these measures and to the changing macroeconomic environment with links to corp sector (combining risk/return trade-offs, funding conditions...)

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### Modeling framework – agent-based interbank + corporate networks

- **Four round model** – endogenous formation
- **Interbank** augmented by non-bank corporate sector (called: **firms**)
  1. offers of interbank placements based on individual optimisation of interbank asset structures
  2. funding diversification
  3. negotiation phase: matching offers and preferred funding structure in a bargaining game
  4. price (i.e. interest rate) adjustment (if demand \( \neq \) supply)

### Scope for application

- stress tests and dynamic balance sheet tool
- assessing network effects of credit provision to the real economy (shocks from corporate sector)
- parametrisation of LE and concentration limits (so far only for interbank)
Literature – general financial networks

- Interbank market may (in normal times) act as a shock absorber and peer monitoring mechanism (see e.g. Bhattacharya and Gale, 1997; Flannery, 1996; Rochet and Tirole, 1996)

- But interbank market can also be a source of contagion (Allen and Gale, 2000; Nier et al., 2008; Allen and Babus, 2009)

- Empirical studies using overnight interbank transactions data at national level (Furfine, 1999; Upper and Worms, 2004; Boss et al., 2004; Van Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006; Sor amaki et al., 2007)

- But widespread use of entropy measures – too much averaging of the tail risk effects which may underestimate true contagion risk (Mistrulli, 2005)

- Complex network analysis points to robust-yet-fragile character of many networks that result in knife–edge properties where shocks to particular nodes can have systemic effects (Nier et al., 2007; Iori et al., 2008; Georg, 2011)

- Not explaining how interbank network emerges and how reacts to market conditions

- To our knowledge no examples of financial networks incorporating links to the real economy in a “network fashion”
Networks in other research areas: game theory of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996)


Jackson and Watts (2002) combine stochastic games and matching problems to study general principles of network formation in economics

Agent-based approach to address overly complex equilibria – Markose (2012); Grasselli (2013)

Matching (Chen, 2013); (Duffie and Sun 2012) and price formation (Eisenschmidt, 2009) ⇒ mechanisms important for us
The aim of the project is to:

1. understand foundations of the **topology of lending networks** in the economy and (the next steps)

2. analyse sensitivity of the interbank network structures to the heterogeneity of banks (in terms of size of balance sheet, capital position, general profitability, counterparty credit risk) and the changes of market and bank specific risk parameters

3. project the **evolution of the lending network** (given a macro scenario)

4. assess **effectiveness of rule designed to mitigate systemic risk** on the interbank system (esp. pertaining to capital requirements, size and diversity of interbank exposures)
4 round model – outline

The following 4 rounds are repeated until ≃ all interbank assets of a predefined volume are invested (separate for interbank and bank-firm network)

1. Firms make loan offers to other banks and firms which are drawn from a probability map: offers based on optimisation of their interbank asset structures and corporate lending portfolio

2. Firms formulate their preferred structure of interbank (banks) and bank (firms) funding from banks drawn in round 1: based on the diversification of the funding (rollover) risk

3. Firms enter negotiation phase: bargaining game in order to try to match the preferred allocation of the assets and the preferred structure of interbank (bank) funding

4. Firms reconsider their pricing offers: firms with open funding gap incrementally adjust their offers of interest payments on new loan (optional feature, not used so far in the exposition)

At each step, assets are “matched” with liabilities incrementally
Figure 1: The sequential four round procedure of the interbank formation (formation of bank-firm links separate but analogous)

INITIAL PARAMETERS
Aggregate IB lending / borrowing, capital, RWA, CDS spreads, market interest rates

4 ROUNDS

1) OPTIMISATION
Preferred funding structure

2) OPTIMISATION
Preferred asset structure

3) BILATERAL GAMES
Bargaining game

4) PRICE
Interest rate adjustment

NEW PLACEMENTS
Part of unallocated IB assets placed in banks as deposits creating IB linkages

STEPS Repeated until all IB assets are allocated

Partial allocation

Unallocated IB assets and liabilities

Full allocation

IB Network Completed

INITIAL PARAMETERS
Aggregate IB lending / borrowing, capital, RWA, CDS spreads, market interest rates

1) OPTIMISATION
Preferred funding structure

2) OPTIMISATION
Preferred asset structure

3) BILATERAL GAMES
Bargaining game

4) PRICE
Interest rate adjustment

NEXT STEP

Repeat steps until partial allocation

IB Network Completed

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Table 1: Overview of data inputs

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Sources</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Coverage</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>As identified in 2011 EBA Disclosures; 80 banks from EU countries. + 500 randomly generated banks based on TA</td>
<td>EBA, Halaj and Kok (2014) + Bankscope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-financial corporations</td>
<td>Members of the benchmark equity indices in the countries covered by EBA Disclosures and Halaj and Kok (2014); total 700 firms</td>
<td>Bloomberg and ECB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Attributes</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Total assets, IB assets, securities, securities MtM, equity, CT1 capital, IB liabilities</td>
<td>EBA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Loans to non-fin. corporations: calculated by using avg. country ratio of such loans to TA based on the ECB (MFI) balance sheet dataset</td>
<td>ECB calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Banks</td>
<td>Economic activity code (NACE), CDS of senior debt with 5 maturity, and long-term issuer ratings by Moody’s, Fitch and S&amp;P.</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-financial corporations</td>
<td>Total assets, total equity, total liabilities, NACE code, CDS spreads of senior debt with 5 maturity, and long term ratings by Moody’s, Fitch and S&amp;P.</td>
<td>Bloomberg</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-financial corporations</td>
<td>Loans from banks: calculated by using the average country ratio of loans to total assets of NFCs based on the ECB EA Accounts dataset.</td>
<td>ECB calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lending relations and other supportive variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lending relationship</td>
<td>Defined as the number of loans with different banks; average figures by country and NACE sector were applied based on the data provided through the Working Group on Credit Registers</td>
<td>ECB calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest rates on loans by size and country</td>
<td>Avg. interest rates on loans by size of loan and by country based on the ESCB MIR data; categories of loans as follows: (below 0.25 EUR mn), (equal or above 0.25-1 EUR mn), and (over 1 EUR mn).</td>
<td>ECB calculations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected default frequencies</td>
<td>Avg. of expected default frequencies for non-financial corp. by country and NACE.</td>
<td>Moody’s KMV and ECB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sampling of the network

- Observed nodes (banks + non-bank corporate firms) and +500 generated banks
  - generated banks: based on the total assets and proportional allocation of other attributes
- Lending relationship:
  - \{bank\}–\{firm\}: based on aggregate Credit Register data
    - \(\rightarrow\) out-degree distribution (for each NACE sector) \(\rightarrow\) the cardinal number of set \(B^k_j\) of firms \(k\) to which a bank \(j\) grants loans is constrained by a number \(m_j\) drawn from the out-degree distribution, i.e. \(#B^k_j \leq m_j\)
  - \(\rightarrow\) probability that a bank in a given country lends to a firm from a given country and a given (NACE) sector
    - \{EBA sample bank\}–\{EBA sample bank\}: EBA disclosures
    - \{small bank\}–\{EBA sample bank\}: arbitrary [small] probability of connection (= 0.01)
Applications – policy implications

Event-driven contagion (realised)

Deterioration of credit quality in a given sector (NACE) – corporate loan losses trigger contagion

Plan: realised for pure interbank network (Halaj and Kok, 2014)

Large Exposure limits – compactness of the networks (planned)
lower bilateral exposures allowed ⇒ more connections

Network reactions to adverse market conditions (planned)

passing macro scenarios via dynamic BS model (Hałaj, 2013):
baseline macro scenario ⇒ optimising behaviour of banks ⇒ change in banks’ preferred aggregate interbank lending and borrowing ⇒ endogenous formation of the interbank under specified regulatory regime ⇒ adverse macro shock ⇒ banks defaults ⇒ contagion

CVA – crowding out bad quality borrowers (planned)
supposedly, banks would shift towards lending to high quality borrowers
Figure 3: Contagion simulation

- Contagion mechanism – cascade triggered by a deterioration of credit quality of loan portfolios to companies in a given NACE sector imposing 5% PD and 50% LGD
- “Spectral” graph shows impact of the contagion losses of 500+ banks (the darker the bar, the higher the fraction of capital wiped out by contagion)
Contagion mechanism – cascade triggered by a deterioration of credit quality of loan portfolios to companies in a given NACE sector for (y-axis) PD $\in \{5\%, 10\%, \ldots, 100\%\}$ and 50% LGD

“Spectral” graph of contagion losses of 500+ banks (the darker the bar, the higher the fraction of capital wiped out by contagion)
Figure 5: Second round defaults of banks in the cascade of contagion spreading triggered by losses in the portfolio of loans to the manufacturing sector in DE

- Defaults of banks triggered by banks failing to pay back their obligations as a result of losses related to decreasing credit quality of manufacturing loan portfolio in (counterfactual example!) Germany
- Each bar indicates a defaulting bank
Conclusions

- Endogenous interbank networks give an important insight into the role of banks’ investment and funding strategies in shaping the interbank market and non-bank firms’ funding channels. The simple, mechanistic cascade models are too simplistic in assuming that banks do not react to actions of other interbank participants and market conditions.
- It is easier to introduce heterogeneity of agents if the network approach is taken rather than macroeconomic (e.g. general equilibrium) framework.
- In the proposed framework, we are able to analyse different policy measures addressing the systemic risk – their ultimate impact on the market structure and efficiency in reducing the contagion risk.
- More stability and robustness checks must be performed in order to understand the complexity of the relationship between market parameters and network topologies.
- The model needs to be calibrated to the observed interbank / lending networks. How far are we from the truth?
Prerequisites

- **(nodes)** $N$ banks and $M$ non-bank firms: capital and bank borrowing + out-degree distribution within (NACE) sectors
- **(exposures)** Let $L_{ij}$ denotes the interbank (bank) placement (loan) of bank $j$ in bank (firm) $i$.
- **(capital position – constraint for risk-taking)** total capital $e$ and capital $e' \leq e$ allocated to the interbank assets, $e^C \leq e$ allocated to non-bank firms; risk weights $\omega$ of exposures.
- **(probability map $P$)** of interbank and bank-firm connections drawn from $P$ allowing for capturing possible customer relationship between banks and firms. Each bank $j$ draws its counterparties $B_j^k \subset \mathbb{N}/\{j\}$, enlarging the set at each step $k$: $\bar{B}_j^{k+1} = \bar{B}_j^k \cup B_j^{k+1}$; In addition, firms choose max number ($m_j$) of banks granting loans based on out-degree distribution, i.e. $\#B_j^{k+1} \leq m_j$
- **(matching)** at step $k$ incremental matching of assets and liabilities: $\bar{a}_j^k = \bar{a}_j^{k-1} - \sum_i L_{ij}^k$, where $L^k$ is a matrix of placements at step $k$
1st round – Criteria for investment of interbank assets

General idea of banks’ optimising behaviour

Assumption (i): each bank maximises return from loan portfolio adjusted by risk related to interest rates and counterparts’ defaults (with a predefined risk aversion parameter) and taking into account customer relationship, i.e. a drawn sample of banks and firms

Assumption (ii): optimisation of interbank portfolio separate from optimisation of non-bank corporate loan portfolio

Each bank maximises the following function of its interbank exposure breakdown:

\[ J(L_{1j}, \ldots, L_{Nj}) = \sum_{i \in \hat{B}_j^k} r_i L_{ij} - \kappa_j (\sigma L_{.j})^\top Q(\sigma L_{.j}) \]  

Outcome: a matrix of exposures \( L^{I,k} \), whereby optimisation subject to constraints...
Constraints of the admissible set of strategies

The maximisation is subject to some feasibility and capital constraints.

1. **budget constraint** – $\sum_{j \neq i} L_{ij} = \bar{a}_j^k$ and $L_{jj} = 0$, for $a_j^0 = a_j$ being exogenously determined;

2. **counterpart’s size constraint** – $L_{ij} \leq \bar{l}_i^k$;

3. **capital constraint** – $\sum_{i \neq j} \omega_i (L_{ij}^k + L_{ij}) \leq e_j^I - \gamma^\top (\bar{L}_j + L_j)$;

4. **large exposure limit constraint** – $L_{ij} \leq \chi e_j$.

What if the constraints are too stringent for a bank $j$? ⇒ bank $j$ reduces its interbank lending and (technically) the optimisation is solved for $\bar{a}_j^k$ replaced by $\bar{a}_i^k - 2\Delta \bar{a}_i^k$, $\bar{a}_i^k - 3\Delta \bar{a}_i^k$, ..., until $\bar{a}_i^k - k_i \Delta \bar{a}_i^k$ gives a feasible set of constraints.
Diversification risk gauged by default risk

\[ X_j : = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{with probability } p_j \\ 1 & \text{with probability } 1 - p_j \end{cases} \quad (2) \]

Assumption: \( p_j \)s are risky (variance based on time series of CDS spreads)

For a covariance matrix \( \bar{D}_X^2 \) of \( X \), the optimised funding risk is measured

\[ F(L_{i1}^k, \ldots, L_{iN}^k) = \kappa^F [L_{i1}^k \ldots L_{iN}^k] \bar{D}_X^2 [L_{i1}^k \ldots L_{iN}^k]^\top \quad (3) \]

Outcome: a matrix of interbank deposits \( L^{F,k} \), whereby optimisation on the admissible set:

\[ A^F_i : = \{ y \in \mathbb{R}_+^N | j \in \bar{B}_j^k \Rightarrow y_j \leq \bar{a}_j^k \text{ and } j \notin \bar{B}_j^k \Rightarrow y_j = 0 \}. \]

REMARK: inclusion of non-bank corporate sector implies that (3) is also solved by non-bank firms (\( \Rightarrow L^{F,k} \) is \( (N + M) \times (N + M) \) matrix)
Assumption: banks negotiate loans in pairs simultaneously (pair \((i', j)\) knows the outcome of \((i'', j)\) after both games are completed). Case 
\(L_{ij}^{l,k} > L_{ij}^{F,k}\)

\[
G_{ij}^{k}(x) = \left[ U_{ij}^{l,k*} - s_{ij}^{l,k} \cdot (x - L_{ij}^{F,k}) \right] \left[ U_{ij}^{a,k*} - s_{ij}^{a,k} \cdot (L_{ij}^{l,k} - x) \right] \tag{4}
\]

where \(s_{ij}^{l,k}\) is a measure of how much bank \(i\) is willing to deviate from his optimal funding strategy, i.e.

\[
s_{ij}^{l,k} = \max \left( \frac{U_{ij}^{l,k}(L_{ij}^{F,k}) - U_{ij}^{l,k}(L_{ij}^{l,k})}{|L_{ij}^{l,k} - L_{ij}^{F,k}|}, 0 \right),
\]

where \(U_{ij}^{l,k}(x) = -F(L_{i1}^{F,k}, \ldots, L_{ij-1}^{F,k}, x, L_{ij+1}^{F,k}, \ldots, L_{iN}^{F,k})\) (for \(s_{ij}^{a,k}\) analogously, ... and for \(L_{ij}^{l,k} < L_{ij}^{F,k}\) similar)

Goal of the game: maximisation of \(G_{ij}^{k}\)
4th round – price adjustment [optional]

- After the first 3 rounds of a step $k$ some banks may still have a gap in the interbank funding $\Rightarrow$ adjustment to the offered interest rate on new interbank deposits to increase a chance to obtain funding in step $k + 1$
- If at the step $k + 1$ the gap amounts to $g_i^{k+1} = l_i - \sum_j \bar{L}_{ij}^{k+1}$ then the adjusted offered rate satisfies $r_i^{k+1} = r_i^k \exp(\alpha g_i^{k+1}/l_i)$.

REMARK: in the baseline case we assume $\alpha = 0$