

Cambridge Judge Business School

Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies 2018 Risk Summit

THREAT ACTORS IN THE CYBER BLACK ECONOMY

Andrew Smith, Research Assistant
Centre for Risk Studies


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Economic Loss Caused by Threat Actor Categories

Percentage of Economic Loss per Threat Actor Category



Estimated **\$1.5 Trillion** of economic loss caused by threat actors

- Nation State and State-Sponsored
- Organised Cyber Criminal: Hub and Hierarchical
- Mercenary Hackers
- Hactivist
- Other: Script Kiddies, Cyber Terrorist

Sample of Known Threat Actor Groups

■ Nation State

- NSA
- GCHQ
- Comment Panda

■ State-Sponsored

- Sofacy (Fancy Bear)
- Lazarus Group
- Equation Group

■ Mercenary

- Hidden Lynx

■ Organised Crime

- Carbanak
- Wolf Spider
- Butterfly
- Carberp
- Cobalt
- DarkHotel

■ Vigilante Hackers

- Lulsec
- Lizard Squad

■ Hacktivists

- Anonymous
- Syrian Electronic Army
- TeaMp0ison

■ Cyber Terrorism

- Hezbollah Cyber Group
- Tunisian Fallaga Team
- United Cyber Caliphate



Energetic Bear




Lulsec



Syrian Electronic Army

Threat Actor Annual Activity

Threat Actor Activity 10/2016-12/2017



11
Events
To Scale

- Russian State-Sponsored
- Organised Cyber Criminal
- North Korean State-Sponsored
- Chinese State-Sponsored

Organised Cyber Criminals Groups: Hub and Hierarchical

- Organised cyber criminal groups are motivated by financial gain
 - Maximise profits
- Two distinct business models of cyber criminal organisations
- Hierarchical groups are similar to traditional organised crime groups
 - Clear management structure
 - Division of labour
 - Often operate in physical premises
- Hub groups operate solely as a 'black e-commerce' organisation or as a 'hybrid'
 - Core group of threat actors
 - Solicitate the help of associates in their network

Threat Actor	Skill Level	Labour	Resources	Visibility	Targeting	Motivations	Geo Target	Threat Rank	Count
Hub	Medium	8*	\$0.1m	Covert	Opportunistic	Monetary	No	4	6400
Hierarchical	Medium	27	\$1-3m	Covert	Opportunistic	Monetary	No	3	4500

Hacknomics: Behaviour of Cyber Criminals

- Hacknomics perspective: business model of threat actors
- Cyber threat actors have scarce resources
 - Opportunity cost
- Targeting decisions based on a cost-benefit framework
 - Logistical burden vs expected benefits
- Regime changes in the cyber risk landscape alter the equilibrium of the cyber black economy


Regime Shift: Cyber Black Markets

- The development of black markets has changed the business model of cyber criminals
- Estimated 18 active markets in the cyber black economy
- Emergence of new business model: Crime-as-a-service
- Marketplace products
 - Stolen records
 - Zero-day exploits/exploit kits
 - Malware
 - Mercenary hackers




Decreasing Price of Commodity Malware

- Cyber criminal business models are not following internal economies of scale
 - Outsourcing
- Commodity malware decreases the skill level and resource cost per attack
 - Lowers logistical burden
 - Reduces barriers to entry
- More cyber criminals in the black economy
- Likely increase in the frequency of attacks




Internal Production vs Outsourcing Example

Locky Ransomware: Internal Production




Petya Ransomware: Outsourcing



Mitigating Threat Actor Activity

- **What does hackonomics teach us about reducing cyber risk?**
- **Targeting behaviour**
 - Map companies characteristics to motivations and capabilities of threat actors
 - Target substitution: path of least resistance for threat actors
- **Combat crime as-a-service model**
 - Patch maintenance
 - Incentivise ‘white/grey’ hat actors
 - Increases logistical burden
- **Understand how future trends alter the fragile equilibrium between cyber attackers and defenders**



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