

BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

# Filling in the Blanks: Interbank Linkages and Systemic Risk

Kartik Anand, Bank of Canada Ben Craig, Deutsche Bundesbank <u>Goetz von Peter</u>, Bank for International Settlements




Cambridge – September 2014

#### Motivation

- Interbank contagion is central, but bilateral linkages often unknown
- Standard: estimate counterparty exposures by **maximum entropy**
- Yet spreading exposures as evenly as possible can be misleading:
  - Conceals "true" structure of linkages in network analysis
  - Diversification assumption causes bias in systemic stress tests
- This short paper proposes opposite benchmark: **minimum density**
- Produces a highly concentrated sparse network that
  - Retains some of the original network structure, and
  - Provides useful robustness bounds for systemic stress tests




#### Actual Data




#### True Network

#### **Observable Interbank Market**




#### **Estimated Networks**

**Maximum Entropy Solution** 



#### **Minimum Density Solution**



BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS

#### Roadmap

- Part I: The minimum density approach (MD)
- Part II: Network features of estimated benchmarks (ME, MD) versus the "true" interbank network
- Part III: Performance in a systemic stress test



#### Part I: Maximum Entropy vs Minimum Density

- Notation:
  - Interbank network:  $X \in [0, \infty)^{N \times N}$
  - Bilateral exposures:  $X_{ij} \ge 0 \ (X_{ii} = 0)$
  - Interbank assets:  $A_i = \sum_j X_{ij}$
  - Interbank liabilities  $L_i = \sum_j X_{ji}$  = "marginals"
- Suppose we only know the marginals A<sub>i</sub> and L<sub>i</sub> for each of the N banks
  → estimate max entropy E and min density solution Z on marginals
- Entropy: find matrix  $\mathbb{E}$  that satisfies the marginals, given "prior"  $Q_{ij} = A_i L_j$ :

$$\min_{\mathbb{E}} \sum_{i,j} E_{ij} \log \frac{E_{ij}}{Q_{ij}} \text{ s.t. } \sum_{j} E_{ij} = A_i \text{ and } \sum_{j} E_{ji} = L_i$$



## The Maximum Entropy solution ${\ensuremath{\mathbb E}}$

- Advantages:
  - Implementable using a standard iterative algorithm (RAS)
  - Yields a unique solution for E
- Disadvantages:
  - Is optimal only if *nothing else* is known about a network
  - Completeness contradicts facts of real interbank networks:
    - Sparsity (Bech Atalay 2010), Tiering (Craig von Peter 2014), relationships (Cocco et al 2009), with disassortative features.
  - When diversification reduces contagion, entropy underestimates systemic risk (Mistrulli 2011, Markose 2012)
  - $\rightarrow$  Case for an alternative benchmark



#### The Minimum Density method

- **Premise**: Network linkages are costly and based on relationships
- **Efficiency:** Minimally connected network s.t. satisfying marginals:

$$\min_{\mathbb{Z}} \sum_{i=1}^{N} \sum_{j\neq i}^{N} c \times \mathbf{1}_{[Z_{ij}>0]} \text{ s.t.}$$
$$\sum_{j=1}^{N} Z_{ij} = A_i \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$
$$\sum_{j=1}^{N} Z_{ij} = L_i \quad \forall i = 1, 2, \dots, N$$
$$Z_{ij} \ge 0 \quad \forall i, j$$

Analogous to transport network design problems: NP-hard (O'Kelly 2012)



### Approach guided by two main ideas

• Robust choice under uncertainty  $\rightarrow$  multinomial logit function

$$\max_{p \in \Delta} \left[ \mathbf{v}' \mathbf{p} - \delta v(\mathbf{p}, \mathbf{q}) \right] \implies p_i^* = \frac{q_i e^{v_i/\delta}}{\sum_{j \in \mu} q_i e^{v_j/\delta}}$$

 Prior ~ economic incentives: focus on disassortative relationships matching large surpluses with small deficits and v.v.

$$Q_{ij} \propto \max\left\{\frac{AD_i}{LD_j}, \frac{LD_j}{AD_i}\right\} \quad \forall i, j \in \mu.$$

- $i \rightarrow j$  if big lender to small borrower, or small lender to big borrower
- Algorithm identifies probable links to load to the maximum extent.



8

21.15

### The Minimum Density Algorithm

Complexity rises exponentially (2<sup>N</sup>) even before allocating value  $\rightarrow$  algorithm

- 1) Compute current deficits  $AD_i = (\sum_j Z_{ij} A_i), \ LD_i = (\sum_j Z_{ji} L_i)$
- 2) Select link (i, j) according to probability  $Q_{ij} \propto \max\left\{\frac{AD_i}{LD_i}, \frac{LD_j}{AD_i}\right\} \forall i, j$
- 3) Load exposure  $Z_{ij} = \lambda \times \min\{AD_i, LD_j\}$  with  $\lambda = 1$ , or less\* If  $V(\mathbb{Z}' = \mathbb{Z} + \mathbb{Z}_{ij}) \ge V(\mathbb{Z})$ , then accept link  $Z_{ij}$
- 4) Update set of priors  $Q_{ij}$  as in steps 1-2)
- 5) Iterate until 100% volume is allocated  $\sum \sum Z_{ij} = \sum \sum X_{ij} = \sum A_i$ 
  - Interbank assets matched:  $\sum_{i} Z_{ij} = A_i \quad \forall i$
  - Interbank liabilities matched:  $\sum_i Z_{ji} = L_i \quad \forall i$
- \* We can generate "low density" solutions using  $\lambda < 1$ .



### Part II: Comparing benchmarks with the original network

• The "true" interbank network X constructed from Bundesbank data

- "Gross- und Millionenkreditstatistik" between 2000+ banks
- All large (≥€ 1.5m) or concentrated (>10% K) exposures
- Consolidated at the bank holding company level ("Konzern") and excluding cross-border linkages
- Basic features: large market (N = 1779), considerable volume (>\$1 trillion), sparse (density=0.59%) core-periphery structure
- Maximum Entropy (ME) blurs network structure (density 93%)
- Minimum Density (MD) solution is "too" efficient (density 0.1%)



Concentration of Value




Figure 2: The figure shows the concentration of value on the largest links for the different networks. The x-axis ranks bilateral linkages (in descending order of size) and expresses the first n links as a share of the total number of links in the original network X (18624). The y-axis shows the cumulative share of value allocated to the largest n links, relative to total interbank volume. The dots indicate at which point 100% of volume has been reached. For X this is at unity, for Z this occurs at 0.185, whereas E needs 158 times the number of links in X before reaching 100% of interbank volume.

#### MD preserves some structural features – ME fails to do so

Network	E	X	$\mathbb{Z}$	¥
Characteristic	Max Entropy	True Network	Min Density	Low Density
Density, in %	92.8	0.59	0.11	0.61
Degree (average)	1649	10.5	1.94	10.9
Degree (median)	1710	6	1	4
Assortativity	-0.03	-0.53	-0.40	-0.32
Dependence when borrowing, %	12.2	84.7	97.3	93.4
Dependence when lending, $\%$	7.2	45.1	97.4	87.2
Clustering local average, %	99.8	33.4	0.03	7.62
Core size, % banks	92.6	2.5	1.1	2.1
Error score, % links	14.6	9.2	41.2	35.7

Table 1: Comparing basic network features of benchmark estimates with those of the original German interbank network.






Figure 3: The figure displays the degree distribution in its cumulative form, showing the number of banks with degree greater than the number shown on the x-axis, on a double log scale. A straight line would indicate a Pareto cumulative indicative of a power law distribution. The degree distribution of the original network X has been smoothed to preserve the confidentiality of individual bank data and shows averages at the end-points instead.






Figure 4: This figure shows three network features for 65 different low density solutions  $\mathbb{Y}$ . The implementation here sets  $\lambda = 0.5$  for the first k links being filled by the algorithm and  $\lambda = 1$  thereafter, with k raised from 0 to 100,000 in 65 (unequally spaced) steps. The first realization (at k = 0) is the minimum density network  $\mathbb{Z}$  with the network features shown as red dots (as in Table 1). The black circles indicate the values for the original network  $\mathbb{X}$ , plotted at the point where a comparable low density network  $\mathbb{Y}$  reaches a density similar to  $\mathbb{X}$  (at k=16,000).




#### Part III: Performance in systemic stress tests


- Run stress tests to compare ME, MD with "true" network in practice
- Standard simulation methodology ingredients:
  - Trigger: single bank failure (+ a capital shock)
  - Mechanism: (1) sequential default algorithm, and
  - (2) Eisenberg-Noe clearing vector (endogenous LGD + cost β)
- Let each of 1779 banks fail 1x1 and measure contagion (if any):
  - # banks in default as a consequence of contagion (excluding i)
  - System assets affected, and deadweight loss (€ bn)
  - Report average over i's, and repeat for higher LGD or costs β.
- Evaluate how close contagion in  $\mathbb{E}$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}$  is to "true contagion" in  $\mathbb{X}$ .



### Test 1: Sequential default algorithm



## Test 2: Clearing vector methodology (Eisenberg-Noe)



#### Interpretation

- Results are similar across contagion methodologies...
- ... but differ across interbank networks  $\mathbb{E}$ ,  $\mathbb{Z}$ ,  $\mathbb{X}$  (the inputs)
- Max entropy  $\mathbb{E}$  underestimates systemic stress substantially:
  - Diversified exposures, smaller losses can be absorbed
- Min density  $\mathbb{Z}$  overstates contagion for most of parameter space
  - + Concentrated exposures, failure may kill the counterparty
  - Sparsity: fewer conduits for the propagation of losses
  - Former dominates due to negative assortativity in  $\mathbb Z$  and  $\mathbb X$
- In line with earlier findings on bias (Mistrulli 2011)...
- ...but no tipping point in sight (Nier et al 2007, Gai et al 2011).



# Conclusion

- The paper had a simple goal: to provide a meaningful alternative to the maximum entropy benchmark for estimating counterparty exposures
- Min density solution uses information theory and economic rationale
- The solution retains more structural features of the original network
- In stress testing applications:
  - ME understates contagion, whereas MD generally overstates it
  - Using ME & MD jointly delivers a useful confidence interval, and
  - MD also allows for many interior outcomes (low density solutions).

The broad interval shows: pattern of linkages matters for systemic risk!

Thanks for your attention.

