Characterization of Lower-bound and Upper-bound of Required Settlement Fund under Real-Time Gross Settlement

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
Financial Risk & Networks Theory Conference 2015

Interbank Settlement Systems

Interbank Settlement System: TARGET2, CHAPS, BOJ-Net, Fedwire

"real-time gross settlement" (RTGS) system

- small risk, large requirement of settlement fund
- ↔ "designated-time net settlement"(DTNS) system
 - large risk, small requirement of settlement fund



- How much settlement fund is to be required under RTGS?
 - in the face of complex network of obligations

(about 500 participants, 50,000 daily transactions in the BOJ-NET)

which and how network structure matters?

- theoretical approach formalize as network problem (, omitting incentive) characterize the problem with network factors

What this paper does

- settlement in interbank settlement systems
 - banks settle obligations on behalf of non-financial customers
 - given obligations in the morning, all settled within a day
 - zero balance in the morning
 - intraday lending by central bank
 - borrowed amount returned at the end of the day
- required amount of settlement fund under RTGS
 - minimum required amount for each realized order of settlement
 - ← no redundant lending, no reserve




What this paper does

• Formalize a pair of minimization/maximization problem

- for given "distribution of obligations" with settlement unit constraint,
- evaluate lower-bound and upper-bound of required settlement fund
- in relation to physically available order of settlement
- Characterize the problems in terms of network factors
 - Propose original concepts on twisted nature of payment network : arrow-twisted, vertex-twisted

example




Framework

- base elements V, A
 - < V, A > : directed graph (vertices, arrows)
- additional elements f, s, p
 - $f: A \rightarrow R_+$ (flow) : amount of obligation
 - $s: A \rightarrow \{1, 2, .., |A|\}$ (sequence) : order of settlement
 - $p: V \rightarrow R_{0+}$ (potential) : allocation of settlement fund
- Networks
 - f-Network : < V, A, f > : distribution of obligations
 - fsp-Network : < V, A, f, s, p > : settlement procedure (for < V, A, f >)


Example

 $\begin{aligned} &V = \{v_a, v_b, v_c\} \\ &A = \{(v_a, v_b), (v_b, v_c), (v_c, v_a)\} \\ &f(a) = 10, \ \forall \ a \in A \\ &s((v_a, v_b)) = 1, \ s((v_b, v_c)) = 2, \ s((v_c, v_a)) = 3 \\ &p(v_a) = 10, \ p(v_b) = p(v_c) = 0 \end{aligned}$




Basic Properties for Networks

- closed < V, A, f > : balanced distribution of obligations
 - $\forall v \in V$, sum of payments indicated by f are balanced




• e-("exact-")covered < V, A, f, s, p > : proper settlement procedure

- (feasible) For payments of < V, A, f >, all the payments are executable at any point under the order indicated by s, and also
- (no redundancy) there exists no other feasible < V, A, f, s, p' > such that p(v)' ≤ p(v) for every v ∈ V, and ∃v ∈ V, p'(v) < p(v)



Formalization of our problem

Given a closed f-Network (balanced distribution of obligations) $N^f = \langle V, A, f \rangle$, $\min_{s,p} \sum_{v \in V} p(v)$ $\max_{s,p} \sum_{v \in V} p(v)$ s.t., $\langle V, A, f, s, p \rangle$ is e-covered (proper settlement procedure)




Approach: Closed Cycle Decomposition

Theorem (Closed Cycle Decomposition (fulkerson, 1962))

For any closed f-Network $N^f = \langle V, A, f \rangle$, there always exists a closed cycle decomposition.


- $N^f = \sum_{c \in C} \langle V^c, c, f^c \rangle$
 - $= \sum (1 \text{ cycle closed f-Network})$
 - Example for closed cycle decomposition



Problem rewritten with Closed Cycle Decomposition

Given a closed f-Network
$$N^{f}$$
, with some closed cycle decomposition
 $N^{f} = \sum_{c \in C} \langle V^{c}, c, f^{c} \rangle = \sum_{c \in C'} \langle V^{c}, c, f^{c} \rangle,$
 $x^{min}(N^{f}) = \sum_{c \in C} f^{c} + R^{min}(N^{f}, C, \{f^{c}\}_{c \in C})$
 $x^{max}(N^{f}) = \sum_{c \in C'} f^{c} * (|c| - 1) + R^{max}(N^{f}, C', \{f^{c}\}_{c \in C'})$
(cycle oriented amount) + (residual)

Example for $\mathbb{R}^{min}(\mathbb{N}^{f}, \mathbb{C}, \{f^{c}\}_{c \in \mathbb{C}}) = \mathbb{R}^{max}(\mathbb{N}^{f}, \mathbb{C}', \{f^{c}\}_{c \in \mathbb{C}'}) = 0$




Major Network Factors : arrow-twisted

Theorem (arrow-twisted)

Given a closed f-Network Nf,

there exist arrow-twisted cycles $\Leftrightarrow \exists (c, \{f^c\}_{c \in C}), R^{min}(N^f, C, \{f^c\}_{c \in C}) > 0,$

Example for $R^{min}(N^f, C, \{f^c\}_{c \in C}) > 0$



Economic interpretation: synchronization inconsistency regarding each payment

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
Major Network Factors : vertex-twisted

Theorem (vertex-twisted)

Given a closed f-Network Nf,

there exist vertex-twisted cycles $\Leftrightarrow \exists (c, \{f^c\}_{c \in C}), R^{max}(N^f, C, \{f^c\}_{c \in C}) < 0$

Example for $R^{max}(N^f, C, \{f^c\}_{c \in C}) > 0$



Economic interpretation: synchronization inconsistency regarding each subject


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arrow-twisted and vertex-twisted


Theorem (arrow-twisted and vertex-twisted)

Given a set of cycles C,

C is arrow-twisted \Rightarrow **C** is vertex-twisted



arrow-twisted, so vertex-twisted



vertex-twisted, but not arrow-twisted

Economic interpretation: scenario dependent feature of arrow-twisted

Summary

- Introduced a mathematical framework for "RTGS"
 - order of settlement
 - timing of payment in addition to balance-sheet linkage
- Provided a general analysis on which and how network structure matters for required amount of settlement fund
 - arrow-twisted"
 - synchronization inconsistency regarding each payment
 - vertex-twisted
 - synchronization inconsistency regarding each subject
 - relation between "arrow-twisted" and "vertex-twisted"
 - scenario dependent feature