

The Evolution in Disaster Scenarios at Lloyd's

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LLOYD'S Short-Tail Accumulation Risk: materiality ranking & methodologies









Uk flood

- Scenario based on heavy rainfall event moving west to east across south-east England
- GBP 6.2bn (USD 9.7bn) industry insured loss
- Flood extent covers 194km² with impact on Oxford, Reading, Slough, and Henley
- Event duration will not exceed 168 hours
- Consider:
 - Pollution (e.g. Carlisle 2005)
 - Road/Rail/Airport disruption
 - CBI supplier extensions



Residential	£4.50bn
Commercial/Industrial	£1.60bn
Agriculture	£0.05bn
Motor	£0.05bn

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The Market >	Operating at Lloy	rd's > Lloyd's Minimur	m Standards > Expos	ure Manageme	nt			

UW 1.5.3 - Exposure Management Methodologies for Loss Estimation and Assessment

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Managing Agents shall use appropriate loss estimation techniques for each managed syndicate.

Managing agents shall ensure that:

- · exposure and loss potential are assessed using one or more documented, validated methodologies or models;
- · the assessment / modelling is carried out by appropriately skilled and experienced personnel;
- there are formal processes to communicate material uncertainty to nominated committees and the board;
- following a material event, they review and adjust their existing review and underlying assumptions as appropriate;
- any external model used meets generally accepted and regulatory requirements for an internal model; and
- when outsourcing the operation of a catastrophe model (or other lost-estimation technique) responsibility for understanding the model, including selection, validation and change, remains with the managing agent.

there are formal processes to communicate material uncertainty to nominated committees and the board;

Emerging risks management



Raise awareness

Some risks are not accepted (yet) as finance or insurance relevant

By describing a scenario (backed by Science) we can raise awareness of the risk;

Scenarios are stories;

Helps to fill availability bias gap





Example: Cyber risks



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Our digital world Lloyd's thought leadership catalogue



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Business Blackout



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Business Blackout

Scenario	Outage duration, weeks (to 90% restoration)	City-Days	Number of damaged generators	Percentage of generators vulnerable to contagion
S1	2	3.78	50	10%
S2	3	8.08	50	10%
X1	4	13.83	100	20%



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Business Blackout



Insurance claims

Power Generation Companies	Ş	\$ millions
Property Damage (Generators)		633
Business Interruption (Generator Damage)		3,817
Incident Response Costs		3
Fines - FERC/NERC		4
Other liabilities		-
Defendant Companies		
Liability		2,253
Companies that Lose Power		
Perishable Contents		595
Contingent Business Interruption - Suppliers Extension		6,769
Liability		3,120
Companies Indirectly Affected		
Contingent Business Interruption - Critical Vendor		2,928
Liability		749
Homeowners		
Household Contents		465
Specialty		
Event Cancellation		63
Total	\$	21,398
	For	variant S1



Counting the cost: decoding cyber exposure

A collaboration between Lloyd's and Cyence July 2017

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Sector	% of all businesses analysed (including	Return period losses (US Dollars)	
	those that are uninsured)	Large loss	Extreme loss
Financial services	10%	\$1.29bn	\$16.72bn
Software and tech services	4%	\$214m	\$1.79bn
Hospitality / Retail trade	11%	\$332m	\$3.08bn
Healthcare	3%	\$60m	\$853m
Other	72%	\$2.70bn	\$30.60bn
All industries	100%	\$4.60bn	\$53.05bn
		95% Cl: (\$1.60bn-\$10.85bn)	95% CI: (\$15.62bn-\$121.41bn)
Duration		12-18 hours	2.5-3 days

Table 4: Return period losses for cloud service provider outage

Demystifying uncertainty...

Uncertainty around aggregating cyber losses means the actual figure could be much higher or lower than expected























Demystifying uncertainty...

Uncertainty around aggregating cyber losses means the actual figure could be much higher or lower than expected





Example: Marine



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Trends in the marine sector

Emerging challenges for marine insurance









Changes in the regulatory environment

Reaction to trends

- In 2016 Lloyd's changed its Marine RDS
 - Collision in US waters between a cruise vessel with 2,000 passengers and 800 staff and crew, and a fully-laden tanker of greater than 50,000 DWT with 20 crew
 - Sinking of a US-owned cruise vessel with 4,000 passengers and 1,500 staff and crew
- And carried out a marine total loss study:
 - explore emerging trends and risks in marine insurance
 - validate current RDS and
 - consider methods for the next generation of RDS
 - explore the tail risk of extreme loss potential for marine insurers
 - develop an approach to populating a probabilistic event set or exceedance probability curve for a marine insurer
 - provide a tool for insurers to use in assessing their own Probable Maximum Losses (PML)



Example: Counterfactual risk analysis



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- 7 July 2017
- At nighttime
- Air Canada 759 almost lands on taxi lane

ACA 759

UAL 1

UAL1118 UAL863 PAL115

- 4 fully loaded and fuelled planes
 - 1000 passengers in all
- Various planes attempted to warn them
- ACA 759 was just 58ft above ground
- 5 seconds from hitting UAL863

18 AVIATION COLLISION

Assume a collision between two aircraft over a major city, anywhere in the world, using the syndicate's two highest airline exposures. Assume a total liability loss of up to USD4bn: comprising up to USD2bn per airline and any balance up to USD1bn from a major product manufacturer's product liability policy(ies) and/or an air traffic control liability policy(ies), where applicable.

Consideration should be given to other exposures on the ground.

Counterfactual thinking

- With thanks to Gordon Woo who is working with us on a report
- Would it have been possible for ACA759 to hit all four planes?
- What is the maximum possible outcome?
- If one plane is hit can others be affected too?
- What was the chance of delaying a few more seconds without acting?
- Do other airports have longer taxi queues?
- What if the planes were more valuable? What is the most value in one taxi queue?

Events

Weight

ID	Desc	Loss	W
1	Event 1 description	USD X_1	1/K
2	Event 2 description	USD X_2	
3			
4			
5			
6			
К	Event K description	USD X_K	1/K



event losses

Events

Weight

ID	Desc	Loss	W
1	Event 1 description	USD X_1	1/K
2	Event 2 description	USD X_2	
3			
4			
5			
6			
К	Event K description	USD X_K	1/K



event losses

Events	5	Hazard	S		Indica	Weight			
D	Desc	Loss	H1	H2	 H _M	11	12	 I _N	w
1	Event 1 description	USD X_1	h _{1,1}	h _{1,2}	h _{1,M}	i _{1,1}	i _{1,2}	i _{1,N}	1/K
2	Event 2 description	USD X_2							
3									
4									
5									
6									
К	Event K description	USD X_K	h _{κ,1}	h _{K,2}	h _{k,M}	і _{к,1}	і _{к,2}	i _{k,N}	1/K





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Events			На	azards Indicators								Weight	
ID	Desc	Loss		H1	H2		Н _м		11	12		I _N	W
1	Event 1 description	USD X_1,1	h	າ _{1,1,1}	h _{1,2,1}		h _{1,M,1}		i _{1,1,1}	i _{1,2,1}		i _{1,N,1}	1/KP
1		USD X_1,2	h	۱ _{1,1,2}	h _{1,2,2}		h _{1,M,2}		i _{1,1,2}	i _{1,2,2}		i _{1,N,2}	1/KP
1		USD X_1,3							i _{1,1,3}	i _{1,2,3}		i _{1,N,3}	1/KP
1		USD X_1,4											1/KP
1													1/KP
1		USD X_1,P	h	۱ _{1,1,P}	h _{1,2,P}		h _{1,M,P}		i _{1,1,P}	i _{1,2,P}		i _{1, N, 1, P}	1/KP
2	Event 2 description	USD X_2											1/K
3													
4													
5													
6													
К	Event K description	USD X_K		h _{к,1}	h _{K,2}		h _{k,M}		і _{к,1}	і _{к,2}		i _{k,N}	1/K

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Event	S		Haza	irds		Indicat	ors		Weight			
ID	Desc	Loss	H1	H2	 H _M	11	12	 I _N	w			
1	Event 1 description	USD X_1,1	h _{1,1,}	1 h _{1,2,1}	h _{1,M,1}	i _{1,1,1}	i _{1,2,1}	i _{1,N,1}	1/KP			
1		USD X_1,2	h _{1,1}	2 h _{1,2,2}	h _{1,M,2}	i _{1,1,2}	i _{1,2,2}	i _{1,N,2}	1/KP			
1		USD X_1,3				i _{1,1,3}	i _{1,2,3}	i _{1,N,3}	1/KP			
1		USD X_1,4							1/KP			
1			h	h	h				1/KP			
2	Event 2 description		n _{1,1,}	р П _{1,2,} р	П _{1,М,Р}	I _{1,1,P}	I _{1,2,P}	I _{1,N,1,P}	1/KP			
3	Event 2 description	030 ^_2							1/1			
4												
5												Empirical cdf
6												
											0	
к	Event K description	USD X_K	h _{K.1}	h _{K.2}	h _{k.M}	і _{к.1}	i _{K.2}	i _{k.N}	1/K		ë -	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
										nulative probability	0.95	

06.0

0.85

0

event losses

1000

Т 1500 Т

2000

500

In summary

Scenarios are used in many aspects of our oversight

We aim to innovate these methods

- Communicating uncertainty
- Probability tree analysis
- Counterfactual thinking

