Cambridge Centre for Risk Studies

Research Showcase 22 June 2015

## UNDERSTANDING CYBER RISK

Simon Ruffle Director of Research and Innovation Centre for Risk Studies

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 $\sin(\pi - x) = \sin(x)$ 

 $+\cos(2x)$ 

 $\sin(\frac{1}{2}\pi - x) = \cos(\frac{1}{2}\pi - x)$ 



f(f) = x dy

an(p)

tan

## **Cyber Research Projects**

#### 'Sybil Logic Bomb' Stress Test Scenario

- First exploration of potential loss correlation in 'cyber catastrophe'

#### Risk Atlas of Global Cyber Risk

- World city risk of economic disruption from cyber

#### 'Erebos Cyber Blackout' Stress Test Scenario

- Cyber attack on US Power Grid
- Lloyd's Report available July

#### Cyber Attack on UK Power Grid Stress Test Scenario

- Scenario in development for UK Power Grid

#### Cyber Aggregation Framework


- Cyber exposure and multiple scenarios of cyber PMLs




## Sybil Logic Bomb Cyber Stress Test Scenario

Introduced key research concepts

- Network Model of the Cyber Economy
- Impact by Industry Sectors
- Systemically Important Technology Enterprises
- Widely disseminated
- Used as a stress test in insurance industry
- Controversial







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
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#### **Cities at Risk: Cyber Catastrophe**



#### Cyber Threat GDP@Risk for 300 cities



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# Erebos US Cyber Blackout Stress Test Scenario

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#### Erebos Cyber Blackout Stress Test Scenario: Aurora Vulnerability

- Idaho National Laboratory 2007
- A generator remotely forced out of phase with the power grid by a cyber attack
- Compromise in either the protection relay or control signal
- Damage to the bushings, bearings, and coupling of the generator
- Generator was badly damaged and functionally unable to supply power to bulk power system

www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJyWng Dco3g









## **Erebos US Cyber Blackout Stress Test Scenario**

- Malware is introduced into electricity generator control rooms
- Coordinated simultaneous attack targetted at two zones of United States power grid (NYISO & PJM)
- Malware finds 50 generators that it can control, and forces them to overload and burn out, in some cases causing additional fires and explosions
- Electricity blackout that plunges 15 US states and Washington DC into darkness
- 93 million people without power.

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More than 17 TW-Hours of generation is lost – around 12% of supply





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
## **Impacts of Power Outage**

- Many companies and commercial activities unable to operate
- Offices and stores closed
- Public transport doesn't run
- Roads are unsafe due to signalling failures
- Many large facilities have backup generators, however as the blackout duration continues for some weeks in many parts of the region, fuel for generators becomes scarce.
- Social impact of the blackout is also severe

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## **Geographical Footprint of the Power Outage**

The outage impacts all companies and population in the following 15 US States + DC


- Connecticut
- Maine
- Massachusetts
- New Hampshire
- New York
- Rhode Island
- Vermont
- Delaware
- Indiana
- Maryland
- Michigan
- New Jersey
- Ohio
- Pennsylvania
- West Virginia
- District of Columbia



Total population of the impacted region: **93 million** 30% of US population and 32% of US GDP

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
#### **Outage & Restoration of Power**






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
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














## **Macroeconomic Impact**

- Uses Oxford Economics Macroeconomic Model of US Economy and Value of Lost Load (VOLL) estimation
  - Outage affects consumption, labour, exports, confidence, and other parameters
- 21% loss of output for 32% of economy for 1 month for current national GDP of \$18 Trillion is around \$100 Bn (0.6%)
- However this shock cascades across the broader economy and effects continue to be felt for up to three years
  - It also affects the economies of other countries that trade with US
- GDP@Risk: US GDP reduces by:
  - Lost output resulting from incapacity of economic activity in region
  - 0.5% of US economy over 3 years



\$243 Bn

## **Insurance Industry Impact**

#### Insurance payouts will be affected by

- Coverage
  - affirmative
  - silent
- Exclusions
- Deductibles
- Limits
- Legal judgements





## **Insurance Policy Analysis**

- FirstEnergy's W. H. Sammis Power Plant is largest coalfired power plant in Ohio
- 7 coal-fired generators and 5 oil-fired generators produce 2,233 megawatts.

## Policy details:

- Annual Premium
- Total Insured Values Buildings, Contents, Business Interruption
- Limits

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- Deductibles
- Exclusion Clauses

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Coincidentally the loss of FE's Sammis-Star 345 kV line triggered the uncontrollable cascade portion of the 2003 blackout sequence.

### **Insurance Claimants**

#### Power generation companies

- Property damage to their generators
- Business interruption from being unable to sell electricity
- Incident response costs and fines from regulators for failing to provide power
- Defendant companies
  - Companies sued by power generation businesses to recover some of their losses under defendants' liability insurance
- Companies that lose power
  - Property losses (principally to perishable cold store contents)
  - Business interruption from power loss (with suppliers' extension)
  - Failure to protect workforces or causing pollution as a result of the loss of power
- Companies indirectly affected
  - Contingent business interruption and critical vendor coverage
  - Share price devaluation generates claims under their directors' and officers' liability insurance

#### Homeowners

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- Property damage, principally resulting from fridge and freezer contents defrosting,

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#### **Insurance Industry Impact**

- It is identified as a cyber attack but never attributed to a perpetrator
- It is not formally declared as a terrorist act, or recognised as an official act of war
- The total of claims paid by the insurance industry is estimated at \$21.4 billion



## **Erebos Blackout Scenario Launch Events**

8<sup>th</sup> July 2015 – Lloyd's report on The insurance implications of a cyber attack on the US power grid




- Report available from Lloyd's website
- Results from research carried out by Centre for Risk Studies
- Centre for Risk Studies London Risk Briefings
  - Cyber Risk in Operational Technology, September date TBD



#### UK Critical Infrastructure Cyber Threat Stress Test Scenario

- UK Power Outage
- Impact on Critical National Infrastructure
- Secondary Shocks
- Stakeholder Interviews
  - UK Power Industry
  - UK Government
- Scenario Development Workshop
  - Cabinet Office
  - DECC
  - CPNI
  - GCHQ
  - UK Power Industry
  - UK/European Insurance Industry
  - Cyber security experts






FIGURE 3.1 Connections and interdependencies across the economy. Schematic showing the interconnected infrastructures and their qualitative dependencies and interdependencies. SOURCE: Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, available at http://www.dhs.gov/spreyprot/programs/editorial\_B87.shtm.



## The Need for a Standardised Cyber EDM

- The insurance industry manages its exposure data in a wide variety of ways
- Cyber is a new class of exposure
- Today many insurers have improvised their own method of capturing their cyber exposure data – every one is different
  - To date we have spoken to over 35 insurance companies
- Standardisation of cyber exposure data is generally perceived to be desirable and would benefit:
  - Exchange of information between companies
  - Reinsurance risk transfer
  - Regulators
  - Models of risk
  - Accumulation management

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The standardisation of a cyber EDM is necessary for development of a proper market for cyber insurance





Cyber EDM Data Schema


- Affirmative Cyber Products
  - Standardized coverage
- Affirmative Cyber Coverage
- Advanced/bespoke coverage
- Silent Cyber Coverage
- 'All Risks' policies without explicit exclusions



## 'Helios' Solar Storm Stress Test Scenario











## **Cyber Research at the Centre for Risk Studies**

- Highly applied
- Plays active role in industry
- Provides tools to help risk management process
- Helps three stakeholder groups
  - Insurance
  - Corporate Sector
  - Government



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