


Understanding Financial Catastrophe Risk:  
Developing a Research Agenda  
Centre for Risk Studies, University of Cambridge  
9 April 2013

# Financial Networks and Cartography



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FNA, [www.fna.fi](http://www.fna.fi)



Map of 1854 Broad Street cholera outbreak by John Snow


# Agenda

Networks "connect the dots". They operationalize the concept of **financial interconnectedness** that underpins **systemic risk**.

The epidemiology of finance is the study of contagion. **Contagion models** are often based on network models. The goal is often to identify and contain "super-spreaders" or "systemically important banks"

Network visualizations allow us to "map the financial system". Maps are **intelligence amplification**, they aid in decision making and build intuition

# Systemic risk $\neq$ systematic risk



News articles mentioning “systemic risk”, Source: trends.google.com

The risk that a system composed of many interacting parts fails (due to a shock to some of its parts).

In Finance, the risk that a disturbance in the financial system propagates and makes the system unable to perform its function – i.e. allocate capital efficiently.



Not:

Domino effects, cascading failures, financial interlinkages, ... -> i.e. a process in the financial network




# Network Theory is applied widely

Main premise of network theory:  
Structure of links between nodes  
matters

Large empirical networks are  
generally very sparse

Network analysis is not an  
alternative to other analysis  
methods


Network aspect is an unexplored  
dimension of ANY data





# Networks brings us beyond the Data Cube

## "The Tesseract"



### For example:

Entities:  
100 banks


Variables:  
Balance sheet items

Time:  
Quarterly data since 2011

Links:  
Interbank exposures

Information on the links  
allows us to develop better  
models for banks' balance  
sheets in times of stress

# First empirics




Soramäki, Bech, Beyeler, Glass and Arnold (2007),  
Physica A, Vol. 379, pp 317-333.  
See: [www.fna.fi/papers/physa2007sbagb.pdf](http://www.fna.fi/papers/physa2007sbagb.pdf)

## Fedwire Interbank Payment Network, Fall 2001


Around 8000 banks, 66 banks comprise 75% of value, 25 banks completely connected

Similar to other socio-technological networks




M. Boss, H. Elsinger, M. Summer, S. Thurner, The network topology of the interbank market, Santa Fe Institute Working Paper 03-10-054, 2003.


# Most central banks have now mapped their interbank payment systems



Becher, Millard and Soramäki (2008).  
[The network topology of CHAPS Sterling](#). BoE Working Paper No. 355.



Agnes Lubloy (2006). Topology of the Hungarian large-value transfer system. Magyar Nemzeti Bank Occasional Papers



Embree and Roberts (2009). Network Analysis and Canada's Large Value Transfer System BoC Discussion Paper 2009-13






# Centrality Measures for Financial Systems

Metrics developed in other fields and with other network processes in mind:

- Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, PageRank, etc.

Recently developed financial system specific metrics:

- Core-Periphery
  - Craig and von Peter 2010, Optimal classification that matches theoretical core-periphery model
- DebtRank
  - Battiston et al, Science Reports 2012, Cascading failures -model
- SinkRank
  - [Soramäki and Cook](#), Kiel Economics DP, 2012, Absorbing Markov chain



[World's Ocean Currents](#)


NASA Scientific Visualization Studio

# Types of financial networks


- Observing Networks
  - Flow: payment, trade, collateral
  - Stock: exposure, co-exposure,
  - Bipartite: trader-asset, bank-risk, ...
- Inferring networks
  - Model: correlation, partial correlation, tail dependence, similarity, Granger causality
  - Data: Asset returns, Balance sheet change, ...
- Dimensions
  - Time: intraday, overnight, long-term
  - Risk: operational, liquidity, solvency

# Inferring Networks


Calculate pairwise correlations




Control for common factors (e.g. market)




Keep statistically significant correlations




Correct for multiple comparisons



Convert to network



Visualize as tree



# Map on cross asset correlations and volatilities

Nodes (circles) represent assets and links (lines) represent correlations between the linked assets


Node sizes scale with the variance of the return: assets with larger nodes have more variable returns

Shorter links indicate higher correlations.

Node color indicates identified community

Mapping multiple dimensions of the same data set on a single map allows visual inference of connections.

One can focus on details - while maintaining an overview.






# Priorities for research agenda

1. Measuring and mapping interconnectedness (network structure), modelling contagion (network process) and understanding their interplay


# Example: Bank-Asset graphs and projections



# Priorities for research agenda

1. Measuring and mapping interconnectedness (network structure), modelling contagion (network process) and understanding their interplay
2. Developing early warning indicators and visual analytics systems for continuous monitoring of the financial system

# Example: Oversight Monitor



(network is fictional)

The monitor will allow the identification of systemically important banks and evaluation of the impact of bank failures on the system

<http://www.fna.fi/solutions/oversight-monitor>



# Priorities for research agenda

1. Measuring and mapping interconnectedness (network structure), modelling contagion (network process) and understanding their interplay
2. Developing early warning indicators and visual analytics systems for continuous monitoring of the financial system
3. Taking into account the 'social psychology' aspect of the financial system