



## Climate policy diffusion: theory, evidence & the international climate change mitigation regime


Geoffroy Dolphin<sup>1</sup>, Michael Pollitt<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Judge Business School, University of Cambridge  
and Energy Policy Research Group

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## The carbon dioxide problem: taking stock



CAT warming  
projections  
Global temperature  
increase by 2100

December 2019 Update



# THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY REGIME

Green from the grassroots?



## UNFCCC (PARIS)

- Overarching non-binding framework
- 1.5-2C global temperature warming objective
- Non-cooperative setting: Intended Nationally Determined Contributions
- Technological and policy flexibility
- Focus: mitigation & adaptation



## NATIONAL & REGIONAL

- Uncoordinated national policy developments
- Some legally binding commitments (Denmark, UK,...)
- Bilateral and multilateral regional initiatives (e.g. US-China Climate Change Cooperation,...)
- Focus: mitigation & adaptation
- GHG-abating and GHG-free technology development



## SUBNATIONAL & LOCAL

- Informal international alliances of local authorities (e.g. C40)
- Exchange of best practices / knowledge
- Focus: policies with local co-benefits (e.g. reduction in local air pollutants, improvement in road congestion,...)



# COUNTRIES WITH CARBON PRICING (1990-2019)



## Time clusters:

- 1990-2004
- 2005-2011
- 2012-2015
- 2015-2019

- Finland carbon tax (1990)
- Poland carbon tax (1990)
- Norway carbon tax (1991)
- Sweden carbon tax (1991)
- Denmark carbon tax (1992)
- Slovenia carbon tax (1996)
- Estonia carbon tax (2000)
- Latvia carbon tax (2004)
- EU ETS (2005)
- New Zealand ETS (2008)
- Switzerland carbon tax (2008)
- Ukraine carbon tax (2011)
- Japan carbon tax (2012)
- Australia CPM (2012 - 2014)
- Kazakhstan ETS (2013)
- Mexico carbon tax (2014)
- Korea ETS (2015)
- Chile carbon tax (2017)
- Colombia carbon tax (2017)
- Argentina carbon tax (2019)
- South Africa carbon tax (2019)
- Singapore carbon tax (2019)



### STRINGENCY OF FOREIGN CLIMATE POLICY REGIMES

- Free riding on others' emissions reduction
- Leakage: domestic emissions reduction alter relative prices and induce a rise in emissions abroad



### [ACCESS TO] GLOBAL TECHNOLOGICAL FRONTIER

- Technical feasibility of abatement
- Cost



### EXPECTED POLICY IMPLEMENTATION COST

- Political cost of economic restructuring
- Resource cost of policy set up

## DOMESTIC DETERMINANTS OF CLIMATE POLICY ADOPTION



### OPEN ECONOMY

- Goods ( $x, y$ ) & factors ( $K, L$ )
- At least one dirty good ( $y$ )
- Consumer derives utility from both physical goods: consumption and environmental quality



### COSTLY ABATEMENT



$$\begin{aligned}x &= B(K_x, L_x) - B(\phi K_x, \phi L_x) \\&= (1 - \phi)B(K_x, L_x) \\e &= \chi(\phi)\Omega B(K_x, L_x)\end{aligned}$$

### FIXED COST OF REGULATION

- Policy activity threshold
- For a given level of income, regulation is welfare maximising only below a threshold level of regulatory cost



## The Diffusion Framework

International environment – domestic political economy – policy adoption

### ALTERED PAYOFFS



#### International competition

- More stringent policy by foreign competitors reduces domestic cost of policy strengthening



#### Mean global policy

- More stringent global policy regime alleviates free-riding effects



#### Technology

- Improvements in and better access to (global) climate change mitigation technologies pool reduces the cost of abatement
- Standard technology diffusion channels: trade, FDI, licensing

### UPDATED INFORMATION (Policy adoption contains information)



#### Communication networks

- Institutional affiliations (OECD, EU, RTAs)




#### Cultural similarity

- E.g. language or religion partner
- Proxied by bilateral trade



#### Learning from success



## Empirics of adoption and diffusion

### Panel dimensions

- ▶ Time: 1990-2014
- ▶ Cross-section: 109 national jurisdictions

Diffusion regressors (for country  $i$  at time  $t$ )

$$\Lambda_{i,t} \equiv \sum_{j \in \Theta_{i,t}} \Gamma_{i,j,t} x_{j,t}$$

where  $\Gamma_{i,j,t}$  is the spatial weights matrix,  $x_{j,t}$  is the variable observed in country  $j$ .

### Adoption models

- ▶ Duration models (Weibull, Cox, Gompertz)
- ▶ This study: probit (right-curtailed at year of adoption)

$$\mathbb{I}_{i,t} = \beta \Lambda_{i,t-1} + \gamma C_{i,t} + d_t + \epsilon_{i,t}$$

## International competition





Figure: Policy stringency in export markets –  $\eta$

## Global mean policy




Figure: World emissions-weighted average price of CO<sub>2</sub>

## Access to global technological frontier





Figure: Climate change mitigation technological stock of import and export partners –  $\psi$

## Information from trade partners





Figure: Climate policies of trade partners (total bilateral trade) –  $\alpha$

**Table:** Policy adoption

Category	Mechanism	Variable	Carbon (1)	Pricing (2)	Climate (3)	Policy (4)
Altered payoffs	Foreign stringency	$\eta(\text{IM})_{t-1}$	+	+	+	+
		$\eta(\text{EX})_{t-1}$	+	+	+	+
	Global mean policy	$ECP_{t-1}^{World}$	+	+		
	Technology diffusion	$\psi(\text{IM})_{t-1}$	-	-	+	+
		$\psi(\text{EX})_{t-1}$	+	+	+	+
Updated information	Policy learning	$\alpha^P(\text{IM}+\text{EX})_{t-1}$	+	+		
		$\alpha^P(\text{EU})_{t-1}$			+	
		$\alpha^{CL}(\text{IM}+\text{EX})_{t-1}$			+	+
		$\alpha^{CL}(\text{EU})_{t-1}$				+
Domestic conditions	GDP per cap.		+	+	+	-
	Trade openness		+	+	+	+
	Democracy		+	+	+	+
	Constant		-	-	-	-
		Year FE	No	No	No	No
		Observations	2165	2141	1200	1197

## Insights


1. Importance of bilateral and multilateral “relationships”: diffusion of technology, transmission of information
2. Emergence of bottom-up (uncoordinated) climate “clusters”
3. Suggests a role for “key” countries in the diffusion process

## Implication


- ▶ Remove obstacles (e.g. trade policy) to climate change mitigation technologies diffusion
- ▶ For “climate leaders”, make domestic climate policies less “inward-looking” in order to be globally effective and avoid the ‘leader’s curse’



## The leader's curse



# Appendix






Figure: Cumulative climate laws – selected jurisdictions




Figure: Cumulative climate policies of import and export partners