Electricity Policy Research Group







EU ETS Auction workshop

Cambridge, January 12th, 2006

Karsten Neuhoff Cambridge University



Welcome to a day of discussion

- under Chatham House Rules:
 - Participants are free to use the information received, but neither the identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed
- we will ask presenters whether we can put their presentation online

Approach I


- Inspirations from other markets
 - US power market auctions Mary Sharpe Hayes
 - Treasury bond auctions Andreas Pick
- Feedback from CO₂ auctions (Paul Klemperer)
 - Hungary Peter Kaderjak
 - The US RGGI program Dallas Burtraw
 - The UK ETS Stephen Smith
 - Ireland Ken Macken

Approach II

- Market requirements (Kate Hampton)
 - Cash flow requirements Jonathan Mirrlees-Black
 - Institutional options Stefan Teis
 - Trader's perspective Rupert Edwards
- Revenue recycling (Michael Grubb)
 - Criteria and objectives Martina Priebe
 - State aid and other constraints Angus Johnston
- Linking it all up (Felix Matthes)


- For different auction frequency & participation
 - Concerns to address in auction design
 - Preferred auction design options
 - Interaction with bilateral trading/hedging
- Host/participants at auction, requirements
- Impact of auctions on cash flow
- Distribution of allowances across auctions
- Coordination across Europe
- Minimum price auction
- Open market sales
- Auctions and market power in CO₂ market
- Auctions and market power in gas/electricity market
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Auction format – concerns to address



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Auction format – preferred options




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
EUA prices (blue) and forward prices for 2nd period (red)




Monthly trading volumes of Phase I allowances



Monthly trading volumes of Phase II allowances



The role of the market



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Host/participation at auction

- Example hosted by European Energy Exchange (?)
- Different designs for T-bonds across Europe
- Participation requirements, costs etc.


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Industry perspectives

- Mickey Mouse econ model would suggest:
 - Buy allowance close to product sales
 - Credit posting at auction
 - If product price reflects allowance cost no exposure
- To what extent does it not apply?
- What is the implication for frequency and timing?

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The distribution of allowances across auctions




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Coordination across Europe

- Are auctions open across member states?
- Does voluntary cooperation create disadvantages?
- Options to cooperate revenue sharing?
- Cooperation required with price floor


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Numerical evidence – projection uncertainty Phase II




- Cap envisaged in NAPII too lax -> Commission reduced by 200 mio. t
- Projections difficult uncertainty about price likely to remain

Minimum price auction – how does it work




Minimum price auction – effect on allowance price



Coordinated auction with price floor can set floor to allowance price

- Facilitates low carbon investment
- Reduces emissions and thus allowance price

Currently proposed fraction of allowance auctions Phase II



Source: Implications of announced Phase II National Allocation Plans for the EU ETS Karsten Neuhoff, Markus Åhman, Regina Betz, Johanna Cludius, Federico Ferrario, Kristina Holmgren, Gabriella Pal, Michael Grubb, Felix Matthes, Karoline Rogge, MisatoSato, Joachim Schleich, Andreas Tuerk, Claudia Kettner, Neil Walker Karsten Neuhoff, 26

Detail – auctions with price floor

- Auctions are viable and simple option for allocation
- Directive allows for up to 10% auctions in 08-12
- We suggest to a coordinated auction with price floor
- Use supplementarity criteria to limit CER inflows
 - if their price too low relative to desired price floor
- Some allowances from auctions will be required
 - thus they determine a price floor
- Price ceiling difficult to align with Directive
 - price spikes unlikely given current projections
 - flexibility from CERs likely to prevent price spikes

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Open market sales

- Presentation of Hungarian proposal
- Under what conditions feasible (frequency, share of market)
- Participation constraints?


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Auctions and market power in CO₂ market

- Follow on French discussion
- What happens with partial auctioning of allowances


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Market power of integrated electricity & gas producer



Source: Memo David Newbery

Market power of joint coal & gas generator



Source: Memo Karsten Neuhoff

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