

The Brattle Group

## Gas Storage Regulation and Security of Supply

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198 High Holborn 1<sup>st</sup> Floor London, WC1V 7BD Tel: +44-20-7406-1700 Fax: +44-20-7406-1702 carlos.lapuerta@brattle.co.uk

#### Summary

Do we have enough storage, and how should we regulate it?

- 1. There is no good rule of thumb for the optimal "number of days" storage. Benchmarking is difficult.
- 2. Storage is just one way of satisfying demand. An analysis of security should consider all supply measures together.
- 3. There is a BIG difference between imposing storage requirements on the market and sponsoring the construction of new infrastructure.

## **General Practice**

• Common practice is to measure the "number of days storage" across countries and markets:

Others have 60 days gas √60 days

Oil markets 60 days

Problems:

- Gas  $\neq$  oil.
- Some countries have just copied oil, may be "wasting money" on gas storage
- All countries are different

## **Differences Among Countries**

Simple benchmarking produces two groups:

> 30 days, avg = 68
< 30 days, avg = 16</li>

Differences are remarkable, but...does Belgium need as much storage as Hungary?



# **Belgium and Hungary**

Factors to consider:

- Belgium has higher daily deliverability than Hungary: 3.76 days vs. 1.12.
- Hungary relies 80% on Russian gas, while Belgium gets gas from the UK, NL, Norway, Russia, Algeria, Qatar
- Belgium has a lot of gas-fired power stations with dual fuel capability.
- Fluxys books storage in neighbouring countries.



Belgium could use more, but does *not* need 4X-5X more.

## Refinements

• More refined benchmarking should distinguish between two concerns:

Short-term Emergencies

- Consider peak, not average day.
- Add *transport* capacity to storage daily deliverability.
- Include interruptible contracts.
- Estimate total daily deliverability.
- "Working volume" only becomes important at *end* of winter.
- Consider "1 in 20" winter.

**Prolonged Interruption** 

- Diversity is critical
- "N-1" concept more suitable.
- Look at off-peak as well.
- Working volume more important.

**Reserve Margin Concept** 

## Conclusions

- Benchmarking the "reserve margins" across countries and checking who can cover an "N-1" contingency is more interesting.
  - Belgium looks great on "reserve margin" but suffers from N-1: great reliance on Zeebrugge LNG terminal. Issue is not so much capacity as diversity.
  - Hungary "needs" lots of storage because its N-1 is an interruption of Russian gas supplies: approximately 80% of total.
  - UK has few days' storage, but reserve margin now looks great.
- However, "better" benchmarking still does not provide all the answers:

Maybe some countries do stupid things: waste money on strategic stocks or take imprudent risks.

## **Supply Curve for Security**

• Need to look at a "supply curve" for security

Linepack

- Existing Pipeline, LNG regas)
- Backup gasoil (interrupting power/industrials)
- Existing underground storage



Costs per unit energy

 $\Delta$  Power sector fuel mix

Challenge is to determine relative heights

Answers will vary but we have found:

 $\approx$ 

expensive,

Capacity

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## **Back-up Gasoil**

There seems to be no consensus on back-up gasoil:

- Generators in UK and elsewhere claim it is impractical/infeasible.
- However, they do it in Singapore, Spain, United Arab Emirates, Ireland
- Provides better security compared to underground storage.
- There may be a serious "grandfathering problem" for existing CCGTs built far away from refineries/supply points— but that is a separate issue.
- Interesting to consider "option contracts" with gasoil suppliers.
- Consensus is that > a few weeks will degrade equipment, but can rotate obligations among power stations: daily interruption capacity / 4 can extend for 60 days.

#### **Two Questions**

- Once you have the "supply curve", measure incremental benefit of additional security.
- Consider two different points for two questions:



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Capacity in Excess of Peak Demand

## **Residential Customers**

Relevance of residential peak:

- Residences cannot make optimal cost/benefit trade-offs themselves.
- Government should stipulate emergency procedures where residences are the "last to interrupt".
- Industrials/power stations will know "they are the first to go", can purchase any additional security they feel necessary.
- To cover the residential peak, a country like Spain might not need ANY new storage.

## **Covering System Needs**

- DIFFERENT issue is deciding whether to build new storage. Can imagine:
  - No new storage necessary to protect residential customers, but
  - *Some* industrial customers would find it worthwhile to finance new storage.
  - Cannot trust market to respond by itself.
- Possible market failures:

Make available, but not mandatory

- Co-ordination among industrial customers.
- Regulation of existing storage prevents emergence of market signals.
- Low tariffs on existing storage threaten economics of new storage.
- Private parties exposed to subsequent construction of competing regulated infrastructure.

- In Spain, France, Italy and Greece, there are good arguments to support centralized planning of storage.
- The UK is different: the move to storage auctions and entry capacity auctions helped pave the way for the market to add new infrastructure.
- In a sense, a country's existing regulatory regime can "trap" it into further central planning.
- However, ending regulated storage and creating market signals are bold and difficult moves.
- Until then, cost/benefit analyses of new storage are better than "rules of thumb" or benchmarking the number of days.

#### **UK vs. Other Markets**

• If the regulator wants to assess merits of new storage, should consider system peak.

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- Should assess how expected cost of interruption would fall.
- Requires estimates of VOLL and likelihood of interruption.



Capacity in Excess of Peak Demand

#### Conclusions

- Storage is just one way of supplying a market. The number of days storage is a poor indicator of security.
- For some reason backup gasoil is not considered sufficiently.
- Minimum storage stocks can be justified to protect residential customers, but in many cases are not needed or would be small.
- A different question is whether to finance additional security.
  - The need for regulatory involvement depends on "market failures" perhaps created by the existing regulatory system itself.
  - Cost/benefit analyses of new storage are better than rules of thumb or simple benchmarking.