Law, Finance and Development (CBR project)

Overview

Aims and objectives

This project has been concerned with the question of how legal rules and institutions shape financial development and economic growth. For the past decade or so, legal reforms worldwide have followed a consistent pattern. Shareholder rights and corporate governance standards have been strengthened in the belief that this would lead to more dispersed share ownership and more liquid capital markets. Creditor rights have been enhanced with a view to fostering banking sector development and flows of private credit. Labour laws, by contrast, have been subject to deregulation aimed at creating more flexible labour markets. A theoretical underpinning for these developments was provided by the so-called legal origins hypothesis, which claims that legal systems affect long-run patterns of economic growth. Systems with a common law origin are said to favour market-facilitating laws, whereas those with roots in the French, German or Nordic civil law tend towards an activist role for the state. These underlying differences of regulatory style are reflected in the contents of the laws governing the business enterprise, and in cross-national differences in economic performance. As applied by the World Bank through its Doing Business Reports, this approach has directly influenced policy initiatives in dozens of countries.

There are problems with the legal origins hypothesis which the project set out to address. The most serious is that evidence for the claims it makes rests on quantitative indicators of legal systems which offer a purely cross-sectional view of the law (mostly of the content of laws as they were in the late 1990s). This is to assume that laws change relatively little and that the rank order of countries, in terms of the impact of regulation on business, does not alter much. In this context, CBR project addressed a need for longitudinal data on legal change and for case studies which could provide a more in-depth and nuanced view of the forces driving the law reform process at country level, and its effects.

Progress

We produced new datasets charting legal change over time in the areas of shareholder protection, creditor protection and labour regulation. We used indices with up to 60 indicators to code for the law of five significant countries (France, Germany, India, the UK and the US) for 36 years (1970-2005), and reduced-form indices of 10-12 indicators to code for a wider sample (25 countries) for the period 1995-2005. The coding methods used marked an advance on previous studies, by incorporating a wider range of legal and regulatory variables and taking into account the different ways in which regulatory rules can be expressed (as mandatory rules or as ‘defaults’ applying in the absence of contrary agreement). We then used time-series and panel data econometric analysis to test for correlations between the scores in the indices and economic performance variables.

The data we collected give a somewhat different picture of the state of the law than that provided by the early legal origins papers. We see considerable change in the area of shareholder protection and corporate governance, with civil law systems ‘catching up’ with their common law counterparts, in particular over the decade to 2005. This suggests that lock-in through legal origin has not been much of an obstacle to the formal convergence of systems. For creditor protection, we do not find such a clear common law/civil law divide, and a less clear convergence trend. In labour regulation, there is a more distinct common law/civil law divide but not much evidence of convergence of systems.

Our econometric findings call into question aspects of the legal origin hypothesis and its use by policy-makers. We find that increases in shareholder protection have not led, on the whole, to greater stock market development. This suggests that a ‘one size fits all’ approach to corporate governance reforms, stressing elements of British and American practice – the role of independent boards and the market for corporate control – may not be working as intended, in particular in civilian systems. On the other hand, we have some evidence that a strengthening of shareholder rights has a positive impact on stock market growth, and changes to the law of secured credit may be assisting banking development in emerging markets. In the area of labour law, we find little or no evidence to support the claim that deregulation leads to superior economic outcomes. On the contrary, at least for civilian systems, we find that the strengthening of dismissal protection has positive impacts on productivity growth, and that working time reforms may help to foster employment growth. In the US, a strengthening of dismissal laws led to higher productivity growth but reduced employment growth.

Our case studies confirm the view that there is no single best model for the laws governing the business enterprise. We show how the reception of Anglo-American norms in civilian and developing systems has often been incomplete and with unanticipated effects. There has been convergence of form, but not of function. Political structures have greater explanatory power than legal origin in accounting for the nature of legal change, but there is also a need to understand the role that institutional forces play in shaping and changing the preferences of interest groups.

The project was completed in 2009. It produced over thirty significant publications and the findings were extensively disseminated to researchers and policy makers. The datasets we created are already being used by the wider research community and we will extend them in future work. The project was given a grade of ‘outstanding’ in an ESRC assessment in 2010 and one of the principal project outputs, ‘How do legal rules evolve? Evidence from a cross-country comparison of shareholder, creditor and worker protection’ by Armour, Deakin, Lele and Siems was awarded the ECGI Allen and Overy prize for legal research on corporate governance in 2010.

Principal investigators

  • Simon Deakin
  • John Armour
  • Ajit Singh

Visiting fellow

  • Prabirjit Sarkar

Research associates

  • Beth Ahlering (PA Economic Consulting)
  • John Buchanan
  • Nina Cankar (University of Ljubljana)
  • Dominic Chai (Manchester Business School)
  • Gerhard Schnyder (Birkbeck, University of London)
  • Priya Lele (Ashursts LLP)
  • Viviana Mollica (Queen Mary, University of London)
  • Sonja Fagernäs (University of Sussex)
  • Mathias Siems (UEA)

Project status

Completed

Project dates

2005-2009

Funding

  • ESRC
  • Newton Trust
  • Japanese Ministry of Education COE grant to ITEC, Doshisha University, Oxford-Man Institute of Quantitative Finance

Output

Datasets

Creditor Protection Index – 5 Countries

Download the data in Microsoft Excel format (xls, 164KB)

Download the data (with detailed explanations) in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf, 504KB)

Creditor Protection Index – 25 Countries

Download the data in Microsoft Excel format (xls, 378KB)

Download the data (with detailed explanations) in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf, 554KB)

Labour Regulation Index – 5 Countries

Download the data in Microsoft Excel format (xls, 186KB)

Download the data (with detailed explanations) in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf, 496KB)

Labour Regulation Index – 25 Countries (in progress)

Shareholder Protection Index – 5 Countries

Download the data in Microsoft Excel format (xls, 245KB)

Download the data (with detailed explanations) in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf, 627KB)

Shareholder Protection Index – 25 Countries

Download the data in Microsoft Excel format (xls, 474KB)

Download the data (with detailed explanations) in Adobe Acrobat format (pdf, 706KB)

Journal articles

Ahlering, B. and Deakin, S. (2007) ‘Labour regulation, corporate governance and legal origin: a case of institutional complementarity?’ Law and Society Review, 41: 865-908.

Arestis, P. and Singh, A. (2010) ‘Financial globalisation and crisis, institutional transformation and equity’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34: 225-238.

Armour, J. (2005) ‘Who should make corporate law? EU legislation versus regulatory competition’ (2005) 58 Current Legal Problems 369-413.

Armour, J. and Walters, A. (2006) ‘Funding liquidation: a functional view’ (2006) Law Quarterly Review, 122: 303-334.

Armour, J. and Lele, P. (2009) ‘Law, finance, and politics: the case of India’ Law and Society Review, 43: 491-526.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2009) ‘How do legal rules evolve? Evidence from a cross-national comparison of shareholder, creditor and worker protection’ American Journal of Comparative Law, 57: 579-630.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., Siems, M. and Singh, A. (2009) ‘Shareholder protection and stock market development: an empirical test of the legal origins hypothesis’ Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 6: 343-380.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Mollica, V. and Siems, M. (2009) ‘Law and financial development: what we are learning from time series evidence’ Brigham Young University Law Review: 1435-1500.

Armour, J. and Skeel, D. (2007) ‘Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? – the peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover regulation’, Georgetown Law Journal, 95: 1727-1794.

Buchanan, J. (2007) ‘Japanese corporate governance and the principle of “internalism”‘ Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15: 27-35.

Buchanan, J. and Deakin, S. (2008) ‘Japan’s paradoxical response to the new “global standard” in corporate governance’ Zeitschrift für Japanisches Recht, 13: 59-84.

Cankar, N., Deakin, S. and Simoneti, M. (2010) ‘The reflexive properties of corporate governance codes: the reception of the “comply-or-explain” approach in Slovenia’ Journal of Law and Society, 37: 501-25.

Deakin, S. (2006) ‘Is regulatory competition the future for European integration?’ Swedish Review of Economic Policy, 13: 71-95.

Deakin, S. (2006) ‘Regulatory competition and legal diversity: which model for Europe?’ European Law Journal, 12: 440-454.

Deakin, S. (2009) ‘Legal origin, juridical form and industrialisation in historical perspective: the case of the employment relationship and the joint stock company’, Socio-Economic Review, 7: 35-65.

Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Corporate governance, finance and growth: unravelling the relationship’ Acta Juridica: 191-218. Deakin, S., Demetriades, P. and James, G. (2010) ‘Creditor rights and banking system development in India’ Economics Letters, 108: 19-21.

Deakin, S., Lele, P., Siems, M. (2007), ‘The evolution of labour law: calibrating and comparing regulatory regimes’ International Labour Review, 146: 133-162.

Deakin, S. and Sarkar, P. (2008) ‘Assessing the long-run economic impact of labour law systems: a theoretical reappraisal and analysis of new time series data’, Industrial Relations Journal, 39: 453-487.

Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘Diversity in shareholder protection in common law countries’, DICE Report – Journal for Institutional Comparisons 5/1: 3-9.

Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach’ Journal of Corporate Law Studies, 7: 17-50.

Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2009) ‘Der Schutz von Aktionären im Rechtsvergleich: Eine leximetrische und ökonometrische Untersuchung’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 173: 119-141.

Schnyder, G. (2010) ‘How political institutions determine corporate governance reforms: the polity, law and corporate practices in the case of Switzerland’ New Political Economy, 15, forthcoming.

Schouten, M. and Siems, M. (2010) ‘The evolution of ownership disclosure rules across countries’ Journal of Corporate Law Studies (forthcoming).

Siems, M. (2010) ‘The web of creditor and shareholder protection: a comparative legal network analysis’ Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law (forthcoming).

Siems, M. (2010) ‘Convergence in corporate governance: a leximetric approach’ Journal of Corporation Law, 35: 729-765.

Siems, M. and Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Comparative law and finance: past, present and future research’ Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166: 120-140.

Siems, M. (2007) ‘Reconciling law & finance and comparative law’ McGill Law Journal, 52: 55-81.

Siems, M. (2007) ‘The end of comparative law’ Journal of Comparative Law, 2: 133-150.

Sarkar, P. (2009) ‘Do the English legal origin systems have more dispersed share ownership and more developed financial systems?’ International Journal of the Economics of Business, 16: 73-86.

Sarkar, P., and Singh, A. (2009) ‘Law, finance and development: further analyses of longitudinal data’ Cambridge Journal of Economics, 34: 325-46.

Schnyder, G. (2011) ‘Revisiting the party paradox of finance capitalism: social democratic preferences and corporate governance reforms in Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands’ Comparative Political Studies, 44, forthcoming. Siems, M. and Lele, P. (2009) ‘Der Schutz von Aktionären im Rechtsvergleich: Eine leximetrische und ökonometrische Untersuchung’, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht, 173: 119-141.

Singh, A. (forthcoming) ‘Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and Economic Crises: Should the US Business Model Replace the Asian Way of ‘Doing Business’?’ Corporate Governance An International Review.

Siems, M. (2006) ‘Legal Adaptability in Elbonia’, International Journal of Law in Context, 2: 493-408.

Siems, M. (2006) ‘Shareholder Protection Across Countries – Is the EU on the Right Track?’, DICE Report – Journal for Institutional Comparisons 4/3: 39-43.

Siems, M. (2008) ‘Numerische Rechtsgeschichte: Sind juristische Zeitreihen sinnvoll?’ (‘Numerical legal history: are legal time-series useful?’) Zeitschrift für Neuere Rechtsgeschichte, 30: 65-77.

Siems, M. (2008) ‘Statistische Rechtsvergleichung’ (‘Statistical comparative law’) Rabels Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht, 37: 354-390.

Siems, M. (2008), ‘Shareholder protection around the world (“Leximetric II”)’ Delaware Journal of Corporate Law, 33: 111-147.

Singh, A., and Glen, J. (2005) ‘Corporate governance, competition and finance: rethinking lessons from the Asian crisis’ Eastern Economic Journal, 31: 219-243.

Singh, Ajit, Glen, J., Zammit, A., De Hoyos, R., Singh, Alaka, and Weiss, B. (2005) ‘Shareholder value maximisation, stock markets and new technology: should the US corporate model be the universal standard?’ International Review of Applied Economics.

Book chapters

Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2005) ‘An ocean of difference on takeover regulation’, in J. Grant (ed.), European Takeovers: The Art of Acquisition (London: Euromoney, 2005), 353-359.

Armour J. (2008), ‘Codification and UK company law’, in Association du Bicentenaire du Code de Commerce (ed.), Bicentenaire du Code de Commerce 1807-2007: Les Actes des Colloques (Paris: Dalloz), 287-310.

Buchanan, J. and Deakin, S. (2009) ‘In the shadow of corporate governance reform: change and continuity in management practice in Japanese listed companies’, in D. H. Whittaker and S. Deakin (eds.) Corporate Governance and Managerial Reform in Japan (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Corporate governance and financial crisis in the long run’, in P. Zumbansen and C. Williams (eds.) The Embedded Firm Corporate Governance, Labour Law and Financial Capitalism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), forthcoming.

Deakin S and Singh A (2009) ‘The stock market, the market for corporate control and the theory of the firm: legal and economic perspectives and implications for public policy’, in Par-Olof Bjuggren and Dennis Mueller (eds.), The Modern Firm, Corporate Governance and Investments (Cheltenham: Elgar).

Deakin, S. and Rebérioux, A. (2009) ‘Corporate governance, labour relations and human resource management in Britain and France: convergence or divergence’, in J.-P. Touffut (ed.) Does Corporate Ownership Matter? (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

Fagernäs, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2008) ‘Legal origin, shareholder protection and the stock market: new challenges from time series analysis’, in K. Gugler and B. Yurtoglu (eds) The Economics of Corporate Governance and Mergers, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2009) ‘Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach’, in T. Arun and J. Turner (eds.) Corporate Governance and Development: Reform, Financial Systems and Legal Framework (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

Sarkar, P. (2009) ‘Corporate governance, stock market development and private capital accumulation: a case study of India’, in S. Marjit (ed.) India Macroeconomics Annual 2008 (New Delhi: Sage India).

Siems, M. and Lele, P. (2009) ‘Shareholder protection – a leximetric approach’, in T. G. Arun and J. Turner (eds.) Corporate Governance and Development: Reform, Financial Systems and Legal Framework (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).

Singh, A. (2009) ‘The past, present and future of industrial policy in India: adapting to the changing domestic and international environment’, in M. Cimoli, G. Dosi and J. Stiglitz (eds) Industrial Policy and Development. The Political Economy of Capabilities and Accumulation (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Singh, Ajit, Singh, Alaka and Weisse, B. (forthcoming) ‘Corporate governance, competition, the new international financial architecture and large corporations in emerging markets’ in N. Allington and J. McCombie (eds) The Cambridge Handbook of Applied Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Singh, A. and Zammit, A. (2011), ‘The global economic and financial crisis: which way forward?’, in P. Arestis, R. Sobreira and J.L. Oreiro, (eds.) An Assessment of the Global Impact of the Financial Crisis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), forthcoming.

Working papers

Ahlering, B. and Deakin, S. (2005), ‘Labour regulation, corporate governance and legal origin: a case of institutional complementarity?’, CBR Working Paper No. 312.

Armour, J. (2005) ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ CBR Working Paper No. 307.

Armour, J. (2006) ‘Should we redistribute in insolvency?’ CBR Working Paper No. 319.

Armour, J. and D.J. Cumming (2005) ‘Bankruptcy law and entrepreneurship’, CBR Working Paper 300.

Armour, J. and Lele, P. (2008) ‘Law, finance and development: the case of India’, CBR Working Paper No. 361.

Armour, J. and Skeel, D. (2006) ‘Who writes the rules for hostile takeovers, and why? – the peculiar divergence of US and UK takeover regulation’, CBR Working Paper No. 331.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2009) ‘How do legal rules evolve? Evidence from a cross-country comparison of shareholder, creditor and worker protection’, CBR Working Paper No. 382; ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 129/09, Winner of the 2010 Allen & Overy ECGI Working Paper Prize 2010 (Best paper in the Law series).

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Mollica, V. and Siems, M. (2010) ‘Law and financial development: what we are learning from time-series evidence’ CBR Working Paper No. 399, ECGI WP 148/2010.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P., Siems, M., and Singh, A. (2007) ‘Shareholder protection and stock market development: an empirical test of the legal origins hypothesis’, CBR Working Paper No. 358; ECGI-Law Working Paper No. 108/08. Winner of the 2009 ECGI Working Paper Prize (Best paper in the Law series).

Buchanan, J. and Deakin, S. (2007) ‘Japan’s paradoxical response to the new “global standard” in corporate governance’, CBR Working Paper No. 351.

Buchanan, J., Chai, D. and Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Limits to convergence in corporate governance: the case of hedge fund activism in Japan’, working paper, in progress; accepted paper for the Strategic Management Conference, Washington DC, August 2009.

Cankar, N., Deakin, S. and Simoneti, M. (2008) ‘The reflexive properties of corporate governance codes: the transplantation and reception of the “comply or explain” approach in Slovenia’, CBR Working Paper No. 371.

Chai, D., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2010) ‘Product market competition, corporate governance and legal origin’ working paper, in progress.

Deakin, S. (2008) ‘Legal origin, juridical form and industrialization in historical perspective: the case of the employment contract and the joint-stock company’, CBR Working Paper No. 369.

Deakin, S. and Sarkar, P. (2008) ‘Assessing the long-run economic impact of labour law systems: a theoretical reappraisal and analysis of new time-series evidence’, CBR Working Paper No. 367.

Deakin, S. and Singh, A. (2008) ‘The stock market, the market for corporate control and the theory of the firm: legal and economic perspectives and implications for public policy’, CBR Working Paper No. 365.

Deakin, S., Demetriades, P. and James, G. (2008) ‘Creditor rights and banking system development in India’, working paper available on SSRN.

Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘The evolution of labour law: calibrating and comparing regulatory regimes’, CBR Working Paper No. 352.

Deakin, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2010) ‘An end to consensus? The selective impact of legal reform on financial development’ working paper, in progress.

Fagernäs, S. (2006) ‘How do family ties, boards and regulation affect pay at the top? Evidence for Indian CEOs’ CBR Working Paper No. 335.

Fagernäs, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2007) ‘Legal origin, shareholder protection and the stock market: new challenges from time series analysis’, CBR Working Paper No. 341.

Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2006) ‘Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach’, CBR Working Paper No. 324.

Lüpold, G. and Schnyder, G. (2009) ‘Horse, cow, sheep or “thing in itself”: the cognitive origins of corporate governance in Switzerland, Germany and the US, 1910s-1930s’, CBR Working Paper No. 383.

Sarkar, P. (2008) ‘Do the English legal origin countries have dispersed shareholder ownership and more developed financial systems?’ CBR Working Paper No. 375.

Schnyder, G. (2008) ‘Does social democracy matter? Corporate governance reforms in Switzerland and Sweden (1980-2005)’ CBR Working Paper No. 370.

Schnyder, G. (2008) ‘Revisiting the party paradox of finance capitalism: evidence from Switzerland, Sweden and the Netherlands’, CBR Working Paper No. 372.

Schnyder, G. (2010) ‘Varieties of insider corporate governance: centre-right preferences and the determinants of reform in the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland’ CBR Working Paper No. 406, June 2010.

Siems, M. (2006) ‘Legal origins: reconciling law and finance and comparative law’, CBR Working Paper No. 321.

Siems, M. (2007) ‘Shareholder protection around the world: “Leximetric II”‘, CBR Working Paper No. 359.

Siems, M. (2007) ‘The end of comparative law’, CBR Working Paper No. 340.

Singh, A. and Zammit, A. (2006) ‘Corporate Governance, Crony capitalism and Economic Crisis: Should the US Business Model replace the Asian Way of ‘Doing Business’?’, CBR Working Paper No. 329.

Conference/Workshop papers

Armour, J. (2005) ‘Should We Redistribute in Insolvency?’, presented at Oxford University Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2006) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? presented at LSE Centre for Corporate Governance Conference on Takeovers and the 13th Directive, January 2006.

Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2005) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? presented at Law, Finance and Development Seminar, Cambridge University, October 2005.

Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2005) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? presented at Sloan/Anton Phillips Conference on International Capital Markets and Corporate Governance, Georgetown University Law Center, Washington DC, October 2005 (with D.A. Skeel).

Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2005) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? presented at 12th Comparative Law & Economics Forum Meeting, Chicago, August 2005.

Armour, J. (2006) ‘Who Should Make Corporate Law? EU Legislation versus Regulatory Competition’ presented at Institute for Law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt, November 2006.

Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2006) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? presented at Association of Corporate Governance Professionals Annual Conference, London, June 2006.

Armour, J. and D.A. Skeel, Jr. (2006) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? presented at University of Amsterdam Centre for Law & Economics, April 2006.

Armour, J. and Skeel, D. (2006) ‘Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers, and Why? The Peculiar Divergence of US and UK Takeover Regulation’, presented to Conference on Soft Law Regulation, Anglia University, August 2006; Seminar at Columbia Law School, March 2007.

Armour, J. and Lele, P. (2007) ‘Law, finance and development: the case of India’, presented to WEF Conference, LSE, June 2007.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘How do legal rules evolve? Evidence from panel data’, presented to WEF Conference, LSE, June 2007, and Law and Society Association Conference, Berlin, July 2007.

Armour, J., Deakin, S., Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘How do legal rules evolve? Evidence from panel data’, presented to IPDM Workshop, Manchester University, November 2006; Research Seminar at Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law, Hamburg, December 2006; Conference on Bankruptcy Realities, University of Texas Law School, April 2007, WEF Conference, LSE, June 2007, and Law and Society Association Conference, Berlin, July 2007.

Armour, J. (2007) ‘The Berle-Means corporation in the twenty-first century’, presentation at conference at Columbia Law School, December 2007, and at CBR conference on ‘Evolutionary and Reflexive Approaches to Corporate Governance’, New Hall, University of Cambridge, December 2007.

Armour, J. (2008), ‘Shareholder protection and stock market development: a test of the legal origins hypothesis’, presented to Public Economics Seminar, University of Oxford, 2008.

Buchanan, J. and Deakin, S. (2007) ‘Japan’s paradoxical response to the new “global standard” in corporate governance’, presented to a workshop at Doshisha University, Kyoto, January 2007, to the workshop on law, corporate governance and finance, Cambridge, March 2007, and to WEF Conference, LSE, June 2007.

Buchanan, J. (2010) ‘Why do boards act differently in Japan and the UK? A focus on shareholder value’ presented to workshop at Waseda University, Tokyo, January.

Buchanan, J., Chai, D. and Deakin, S. (2009) ‘Limits to convergence in corporate governance: the case of hedge fund activism in Japan’ presented to REFGOV CG workshop, Brussels, May 2010, Strategic Management Conference, Rome, September 2009, and to seminar at Korea University, Seoul, November 2009.

Cankar, N., Deakin, S. and Simoneti, M. (2007) ‘The reflexive properties of corporate governance codes: the transplantation and reception of the “comply or explain” approach in Slovenia’, presented to EGOS conference, Vienna, July.

Chai, D., Deakin, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2009) ‘Product market competition, corporate governance and legal origin: a theoretical and empirical contribution’ presented to Strategic Management Conference, Washington DC, October 2009.

Deakin, S. (2006) ‘Timing is everything: industrialization, legal origin and the evolution of the contract of employment in Britain and continental Europe’ paper presented to Panel 35, ‘Making markets through the law: legal claim and economic possibility’, 14th International Economic History Congress, Helsinki, 23 August 2006, and to the Conference on Changing Institutions in Developed Democracies: Economics, Politics and Welfare, Paris, 24-25 May 2007.

Deakin, S. and Singh, A. (2006) ‘Shareholder value reconsidered’, CBR Summit on Innovation and Governance, Cambridge, March.

Deakin, S., Fagernäs, S. and Siems, M. (2006) ‘Law, finance, and development’, ESRC Workshop World Economy and Finance Research Programme, London.

Deakin, S. (2007) presentation of ‘The evolution of labour law: comparing and calibrating regulatory regimes’ to IRRA Conference, Manchester, September 2007.

Deakin, S. (2008) presentation of ‘The evolution of labour law: comparing and calibrating regulatory regimes’ to workshop at ILO, Geneva, January 2008.

Deakin, S. (2008) ‘The corporation and society in historical perspective’ and ‘The diversity of contemporary corporate governance’, Tanner lectures delivered at the Said Business School and Brasenose College, University of Oxford, February 2008.

Deakin, S. and Singh, A. (2008) ‘The stock market, the market for corporate control and the theory of the firm: legal and economic perspectives and implications for public policy’, presented to Research Workshop on Finance and Development, Cyprus University of Technology, Limassol, May 2008.

Deakin, S. (2009) ‘Law and financial development: what we are learning from time-series evidence’ presentation REFGOV workshop, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, October 2009.

Deakin, S. (2009) ‘Corporate governance, finance and growth: unravelling the relationship’, inaugural Mike Larkin Memorial Lecture, University of Cape Town, March 2009.

Deakin, S. (2009) presentation of ‘The legal origins hypothesis: what we are learning from time series evidence’, presentation to conference at Birmingham Business School, July 2009.

Deakin, S. (2009) presentation of ‘The legal origins hypothesis: what we are learning from time series evidence’, presentation to corporate governance seminar, University of Auckland, April 2009.

Deakin, S. (2009) presentation of ‘The legal origins hypothesis: what we are learning from time series evidence’, presentation to legal origins conference at Brigham Young University, February 2009.

Deakin, S. (2009) presentation of ‘The legal origins hypothesis: what we are learning from time series evidence’, presentation to EBRD, London, January 2009.

Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Measuring law: problems and possible solutions’ presentation to Center for Law and Globalization symposium, Measuring Law: How to Get it Right in Real-World Circumstances, Washington DC, March 2010.

Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Corporate governance, finance and growth’ presentation to Good Governance and Regulation Leadership Forum, organized by Central Bank of Nigeria and Nigerian SEC, Abuja, May 2010.

Deakin, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2010) ‘An end to consensus? The (selective) impact of legal reform on financial development’ presented to REFGOV CG workshop, Brussels, May 2010.

Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Takeover bids in the UK: legal and regulatory issues’, presented to workshop at Waseda University, Tokyo, January 2010.

Fagernäs, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2007) ‘Legal origin, shareholder protection and the stock market: new challenges from time series’, presented to WEF Conference, LSE, June 2007.

Fagernäs, S., Sarkar, P. and Singh, A. (2007) ‘The legal protection of shareholders and stock market development’, presented to the workshop on law, corporate governance and finance, Cambridge, March 2007.

Lele, P. and Siems, M. (2007) ‘Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach’, presented to the workshop on law, corporate governance and finance, Cambridge, March 2007.

Siems, M. (2010) guest lecture on ‘Comparative law and finance’, Chiba University, Faculty of Law and Economics, Chiba-shi, Japan, April 2010.

Siems, M. and Deakin, S. (2010) ‘Comparative law and finance: past present and future research’, presentation to the REFGOV CG workshop, Cambridge, 24-25 June 2009.

Siems, M. (2010) guest lecture on ‘Shareholder protection and law & finance’, King’s College, London, Department of Management, February 2010.

Siems, M. (2009) ‘The web of creditor and shareholder protection: a comparative legal network analysis’ University of Manchester Research Seminar Series, November 2009.

Singh, A. (2009), The world economic and financial crisis, Cornell University, September at the invitation of the Department of Economics, the Hans Bethe House, the South Asia Program, Cornell Law School, the Program in International Studies in Planning, and the Tolani Senior Professorship in International Trade Policy.

Sarkar, P. (2008) ‘Does the stock market promote capital accumulation? Panel data and time series evidence from less developed countries’. Presentation to Association for Heterodox Economics, 10th Anniversary Conference, Anglia Ruskin University, July 4, 2008.

Sarkar, P., and Singh, A. (2009) ‘Law, finance and development: further analyses of longitudinal data’, presentation to conference at Birmingham Business School, July 2009.

Sarkar, P. (2007) 1. ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Developments: Analysis of New Leximetric Dataset for India’ and 2. ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development : A Cross-Country Study’, WEF conference at Department of Political Science/Amsterdam School for Social Science Research, University of Amsterdam, October.

Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Capital accumulation in less developed countries: does stock market matter?’ presented to the 4th International Conference on Developments in Economic Theory and Policy, jointly organized by the University of the Basque Country and the University of Cambridge, Bilbao, 5-6 July 2007.

Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Corporate governance, stock market development and private capital accumulation: a case study of India’, presented to the conference on ‘Corporate Accountability, Limited Liability and the Future of Globalisation’ at the Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy (CISD), SOAS, London, 20-21 July 2007.

Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Legal Origin Hypothesis: What the Time-Series Evidence Shows’ Seminar at Université Paris X – Nanterre, November.

Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: A Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis’, 2nd Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies, NYU, November (presented with M. Siems, S. Deakin, A. Singh).

Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Stock market development and capital accumulation: what does the time series evidence show?’, presented to the AISSEC Conference, University of Parma, 21-23 June 2007.

Sarkar, P. (2007) ‘Trend of globalization and stock market development’, presented to the Second Annual International Conference on ‘Globalization and its Discontents’, SUNY College at Cortland, 8-9 June 2007.

Schnyder, G. (2007) ‘Horse, cow, sheep, or ‘thing as such’? The cognitive origins of corporate governance in Switzerland, Germany, and the US, 1910s-1930s’ presentation to Paper presented at the 11th Annual Conference of the European Business History Association (EBHA), Geneva, Switzerland, 13-15 September 2007, and to CBR conference on ‘Evolutionary and Reflexive Approaches to Corporate Governance’, New Hall, University of Cambridge, December 2007.

Schnyder, G (2008) ?’New Wine in Old Skins? The Transformation of Self-regulation in the Field of Swiss Corporate Governance’, paper presented at the LAGAPE Workshop: ‘Liberalisation and Re-regulation Dynamics across Policy Sectors in Switzerland: Towards a New Regulatory Order?’, 22-23 May 2008, University of Lausanne, Switzerland.

Siems, M. and Lele, P. (2006) ‘Comparative company law: shareholder protection: a leximetric approach’, CBR Summit on Innovation and Governance, Cambridge, March.

Siems, M.(2007) made the following presentations: ‘How Legal Rules Evolve? – Evidence from Panel Data’ at Humboldt-University Berlin, International Conference on Law and Society in the 21st Century (7/2007) and for the Faculty Seminar at the School of Law of the University of Edinburgh (10/2007); ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development’ at New York University, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (11/2007) (with Sarkar, Deakin and Singh), at the CBR Conference on Evolutionary and Reflexive Approaches to Corporate Governance (12/2007) and at the Research Seminar of the School of Law of the University of Glasgow (2/2008).

Siems, M. (2008) made the following presentations: ‘How Legal Rules Evolve? – Evidence from Panel Data’ at Humboldt-University Berlin, International Conference on Law and Society in the 21st Century (7/2007) and for the Faculty Seminar at the School of Law of the University of Edinburgh (10/2007); ‘Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development’ at New York University, Conference on Empirical Legal Studies (11/2007) (with Sarkar, Deakin and Singh), at the CBR Conference on Evolutionary and Reflexive Approaches to Corporate Governance (12/2007) and at the Research Seminar of the School of Law of the University of Glasgow (2/2008).

Siems, M. (2009) ‘Comparative law and finance: past, present and future research’ presentation to JITE conference, Kloster Eberbach, June 2009.

Siems, M. (2009) ‘Shareholder, creditor and worker protection: time series evidence about the differences between French, German, Indian, UK and US law’, presentation to workshop on corporate governance, Copenhagen Business School.

Singh, A (2006) Presented a paper on ‘Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and Economic Crises: Should the US Business Model Replace the Asian Way of ‘Doing Business’?’ in Sweden at Jönköping, April 2006.

Singh, A (2006) Presented a paper on ‘Corporate Governance, Crony Capitalism and Economic Crises: Should the US Business Model Replace the Asian Way of ‘Doing Business’?’ at a seminar held at the Collegio de Mexico, Mexico City, March 2006.

Singh, A. (2008-9) American Economic Association meetings in New Orleans, at Birmingham Business School, at the Law Faculty at Punjab University, at New School for Social Research in New York, and the Department of Economic Affairs at the United Nations in New York. He also made a presentation to the Link Party members at the Bundestag at Berlin on Hostile Takeovers.

Media coverage

Armour, J. and Skeel, D. (2005) ‘There is more than one way to regulate a takeover’, Financial Times 22 June 2005 (overview of research on UK/US takeovers).

Deakin, S. (2006) interviewed by the Japanese Open University for a television documentary on corporate governance.

Deakin, S. (2010) ‘No best laws for business’ ESRC Society Today.

Singh, A. (2006) Extensive coverage in all leading Indian newspapers on presentation at the Institute of Political Research in Chandigarh, India.

Singh, A. (2009) gave a long interview to RAESON the Danish magazine (equivalent of the UK magazines The New Statesman or The Spectator) on the subject of the current world economic crisis. Published in Danish in the 2 December 2009 issue of the magazine. An official English translation of the article is available on the internet.

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