Misconduct by insurance agents

About the seminar topic

We examine whether the labour market disciplines misconduct by insurance agents. Past misconduct strongly predicts future misconduct, yet the labour market response is weak. Complaints modestly increase industry exit and appointment terminations, but agents largely replace lost carrier appointments. These consequences are stronger in Texas, the only state that publicly posts complaints. Regulatory sanctions increase exit only when they revoke a licence, yet most revoked agents remain in the industry because licences are issued state by state. For individuals registered as both insurance agents and stockbrokers, the same insurance misconduct has stronger labour market consequences in brokerage than insurance.

Speaker bio

Stephen Dimmock is Professor in the Department of Finance at the National University of Singapore (NUS) Business School and a fellow of the Asian Bureau of Finance and Economic Research. He received his PhD from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and a Bachelor of Commerce from the University of Saskatchewan.

Stephen’s main research interests include household finance, portfolio choice, financial advisors, financial misconduct, endowment funds and behavioural finance. He has published in leading journals, such as the American Economic Review, Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Review of Economics and Statistics and Review of Financial Studies. His research has won best paper awards at leading international conferences.

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No registration required. If you have any questions about this seminar, please email Bet Brooke.