Shareholder Voting Requirements and Voluntary Disclosure in M&As
23 May 2024
10:30 -11:45
Times are shown in local time.
Open to: All
Lecture Theatre 3 (Cambridge Judge Business School)
Trumpington St
Cambridge
CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
Join our Accounting seminar, in collaboration with the Cambridge Corporate Governance Network
Speaker: Dr Tan Do, Bayes Business School
About the seminar topic
We examine the effect of voting requirements on managerial disclosure and the voting outcome in M&A transactions. We find that voting requirements lead firms to provide more voluntary disclosure and in a timelier manner, including disclosure of the merger agreement, information on expected synergies, and post-merger earnings forecasts. We also document larger returns and a larger reduction in information asymmetries in deals subject to vote. More disclosure in the presence of voting requirements triggers more sales from transient institutional investors, changing firms’ shareholder base and increasing the likelihood that the deal is completed.
Our findings suggest that voting requirements lead managers to provide additional information, surpassing the mandatory requirements, to ensure accurate pricing, changes in the composition of shareholders, and the overall success of the transaction. Evidence from falsification tests and a regression discontinuity design supports the causal interpretation of our results.
Speaker bio
Dr Tan Do joined the Faculty of Finance at Bayes Business School (formerly Cass) as Lecturer in Accounting in 2022. Before joining Bayes, Tan did his PhD at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and spent a term at HEC Paris as a visiting student researcher.
His research examines relationships between corporate disclosures and corporate governance mechanisms beyond the board of directors such as shareholder voting and litigation. Tan also studies ownership structure and corporate short-termism and recently explored the network of consumer-based peer firms.
Register
No registration required. If you have any questions about this seminar, please email Eleanor Stefiuk.