From Boilerplate to Signal: Litigation Risk and Investor Responses to Repetition in MD&A Disclosure

event calendar icon

22 Oct 2025

15:00 -16:30

Times are shown in local time

Open to: All

event map pin icon

Castle Teaching Room (Cambridge Judge Business School)

Trumpington St

Cambridge

CB2 1AG

United Kingdom

Join our upcoming Accounting seminar

Speaker: Sheryl Zhang, ESSEC Business School

About the seminar topic

The Accounting subject group would like to invite you to their upcoming seminar by Sheryl Zhang, Assistant Professor, ESSEC.

A longstanding puzzle in financial reporting is why managers, despite having the ability to make forward-looking statements in the 10-K and MD&A, often produce highly repetitive disclosures across years that elicit muted investor reactions. We investigate whether litigation risk for omitting information is a missing ingredient in this equilibrium, proposing that when the cost of hiding bad news rises, repetition in MD&A can itself be interpreted as good news because managers with bad news will be compelled to update their MD&A discussion to avoid legal consequences. Exploiting the Second Circuit’s Macquarie Infrastructure versus Moab Partners ruling, which heightened liability for omissions under Item 303, we test whether litigation risk transforms textual repetition from a sign of boilerplate into a credible signal of favourable prospects. Using a difference-in-differences design, we show that post-ruling, investors respond more positively to textual similarity in MD&A, consistent with repetition becoming more credible once bad news is more costly to conceal. Additional analyses reveal that post-ruling MD&A changes embed stronger information about future earnings and are more salient to investors, as textual revisions are increasingly tied to shifts in tone. Cross-sectional tests show that the effects concentrate among firms in opaque information environments, as well as those with high proprietary costs or weaker incentives to voluntarily reveal favourable news. Overall, our findings suggest that legal forces incentivising managers to disclose bad news can transform seemingly uninformative textual repetition into a tool for credibly communicating with the market.

Speaker bio

Sheryl Zhang has been an Assistant Professor of Accounting and Management Control at ESSEC Business School since 2024. She completed her PhD in Accounting at Washington University in St Louis. Her research primarily focuses on regulation, ESG and disclosure.

Register

No registration required. If you have any questions about this seminar, please email Emily Brown.

Top