(In)dependent Central Banks

About the seminar topic

Since the 1980s, many countries have reformed their central banks to enhance operational independence. Using biographical data, press coverage and expert opinions, we find that during this period, appointments of central bank governors became increasingly politically motivated, particularly following legislative reforms intended to insulate central banks and their governors from political interference. Furthermore, we show that politically motivated appointments are associated with lower de facto independence and worse economic and financial outcomes. As central banks worldwide have gained greater power, our findings contribute to the debate on their democratic accountability and credibility.

Speaker bio

Thomas Lambert is Associate Professor of Finance and Academic Director of the MSc in Finance and Investments at the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University. His research interests are in corporate finance, entrepreneurship, fintech and political economy. His work has been presented at major conferences around the world, including the NBER Summer Institute, AEA, EFA, SFS Cavalcade and FIRS meetings and published in leading academic journals, including the Economic Journal and Management Science. He received several grants, including a Veni grant from the Dutch Research Council (NWO). Thomas holds a PhD degree in Finance from the Université catholique de Louvain, an MA in Economics from the Université catholique de Louvain and has been a visiting scholar at the London Business School and HEC Paris. He was also awarded the 2016 Banque de France Foundation Prize for the best thesis in Monetary and Financial Economics and the 2020 ERIM Prize for Outstanding Performance by a Young Researcher.

Registration

No registration required. For any queries, please email Bet Brooke.