Decoupling Voting and Cash Flow Rights
12 Mar 2024
13:00 -14:15
Times are shown in local time.
Open to: All
Room W4.05 (Cambridge Judge Business School)
Trumpington St
Cambridge
CB2 1AG
United Kingdom
Join our Finance seminar, in collaboration with the Cambridge Corporate Governance Network
Speaker: Dr András Danis, Central European University – Vienna
About the seminar topic
The equity lending and option market both allow investors to decouple voting and cash flow rights of common shares. We provide a theory of this decoupling. While either market enables investors to acquire voting rights without cash flow exposure, empirical studies demonstrate a substantial difference in implied vote prices. Our model explains this surprising difference by uncovering the mechanism by which vote prices in the equity lending market are endogenously lower than those implied by the option market. Nonetheless, we show that even though votes are cheaper in the equity lending market, activists endogenously choose to decouple using both markets.
Speaker bio
András Danis is an Associate Professor at CEU Department of Economics and Business. He has worked at the Scheller College of Business, Georgia Tech, Atlanta, between 2012–2021. Dr. Danis received his PhD in 2012 from WU Vienna University of Economics and Business and the Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF). Previously, he pursued his undergraduate studies at the University of Vienna, where he received a degree in Social and Economic Sciences in 2007. His research topics are corporate financial distress, optimal capital structure, credit default swaps, shareholder activism, and the intersection of labor economics and corporate finance. Dr. Danis has taught finance at the bachelor, master, executive, and PhD levels.
Register
No registration required. If you have any questions about this seminar, please email Emily Brown.